Chris had an objection to Williamson brought up last class. It goes something like this:
Williamson argues:
1) Every metaphysically modal statement is logically equivalent to a counterfactual statement
2) For any two statements, if one is logically equivalent to another then when one is in an epistemic position to know the first, one is necessarily in an epistemic position to know the second
3) (1&2) -> 4
4) If we're in an epistemic position to know counter-factual claims, we're in an epistemic position to know metaphysically modal claims
Chris denies (2). After some thought, I think this is obviously right. For instance, consider a tautology too complex for the human mind to grasp. Then take ~(P&~P). The latter is equivalent to the former, yet we're in no epistemic position to know the former. Alternately, consider someone who's convinced by McGee's argument that modus ponens is invalid. Suppose further this person has (given his evidence) every reason to believe McGee and no reason not to. Arguably, this person could know P&(P -> Q), and have excellent independant evidence for ~Q. Not only would he be in no epistemic position to know Q, he'd be in a very good epistemic position to justifiably doubt Q.
Williamson is a smart guy, and it's hard to believe that he simply missed this. So let's see what he says:
"Given that quivalences (17) and (18) are logically true, metaphysically modal thinking is logically equivalent to a special case of counterfactual thinking, and the epistemology of the former is tantamount to a special case of the epistemology of the latter. Whoever has what it takes to understand the counterfactual conditional and the elementary logical auxiliaries ~ and (contradiction) has what it takes to understand the possibility and necessity operators"
He goes on to consider something like Chris's objection a bit later:
"Indeed, we have no sufficient reason to regard any of the equivalences as strict synonymies. That detracts little from their philosophical significance, for failure of strict synonymy does not imply failure of logical equivalence. The main philosophical concerns about possibility and necessity apply equally to anything logically equivalent to possibility or necessity. A non-modal analogy: ~A is logically equivalent to A->(contradiction), but presumably they are not stictly synonymous; nevertheless, once we have established that a creature can handle -> and (contradiction), we have established that it can handle something logically equivalent to negation, which answers the most interesting questions about its ability to handle negation"
I'm not sure exactly what to make of this, but it seems like Williamson is talking about a specific sort of logical equivalence. Not logical equivalence between statements, rather equivalence between logical operations. A new argument may be set up as follows:
1) If one is in a cognitive position to fluently use logical operator P, and applying P to a formula(s) is logically equivalent to applying Q to a formula(s), then one is in a cognitive position to fluently use logical operator Q.
2) [] is logically equivalent to C, where CA is defined as (~A []-> contradiction).
3) We're in a cognitive position to fluently use C
4) (1&2&3) -> (5)
5) We're in a cognitive position to fluently use []
I see this as no better off than the original argument. For instance, C' could be defined as (~A[]-> (negation of incredibly complex tautology)), and an analogous argument would say we're in a cognitive position to use C'. However, we're not in a cognitive position to use C'.
One could respond that we ARE in a cognitive position to use C', we're just not aware of the fact. This seems weak.
Furthermore, even if this revised argument is sound, it misses the point. We want to know how we know metaphysically modal truths, not how we've come into a position to use them (or something logically equivalent to them). If I want to know how you found out that all renates are alive, I won't be satisfied with the answer "I found out that all cordates are alive". More is needed.
I found this all quite vexing. any thoughts anyone?
Tuesday, December 4, 2007
Monday, December 3, 2007
Comments on Putman’s Thought Experiment: Earth and Twin-Earth
The thought experiment with water and twater tries to convince that our beliefs and desires are not just a matter of what is going on in our minds, if I am interpreting it correct. When I change the example it seems to be more clear, for instance a case between Mary and Suzy. When Mary talks or thinks about her mother, or what the concept of mother means, she refers to someone that gave birth to her and is biologically similar to her. Suzy was adopted, (this is something Mary is not aware of) and she uses the word mother to refer to her adoptive mother. So when Mary talks to Suzy about her adoptive mother she is actually referring to her biological mother. Mary and Suzy both use the same word; mother, but the way in which they use it has different extensions. Maybe this is not a good example because the word mother has many different extensions when someone different uses it, but we can think of it in another way, where there is the existence of a twin earth. On twin earth twin- Mary is exactly the same as earthian- Mary along with everything else except the fact that mothers on twin earth are not biologically similar to their children. If Mary was unknowingly switched in her sleep with twin Mary, she would be using the word mother to refer to someone different then she believes. I’m not exactly sure of why these examples show that the contents of beliefs supervene on our internal states. This seems like it is not a stretch to think that your surroundings and what goes on inside you indicate what beliefs you hold. The examples show then that beliefs that seem to be the same belief- type are actually not because they have different content. So, coming from identical people the beliefs are not the same, so there has to be something other than internally that reacts on belief, but can’t we just say that the fact that we think the beliefs are not the same shows that you and twin-you are not exactly the same and therefore it should be expected that you and twin-you’s beliefs wouldn’t be exactly the same? What about two different people placed in the exact same situations and surrounding acting and doing the exact same things and having the exact same internal goings on but in two parallel worlds or universes, should each and every one of their thoughts be the same? This example seems to me to also show that beliefs are caused by internal and external components. The examples just seem to give you what would already seem intuitive.
The thought experiment with water and twater tries to convince that our beliefs and desires are not just a matter of what is going on in our minds, if I am interpreting it correct. When I change the example it seems to be more clear, for instance a case between Mary and Suzy. When Mary talks or thinks about her mother, or what the concept of mother means, she refers to someone that gave birth to her and is biologically similar to her. Suzy was adopted, (this is something Mary is not aware of) and she uses the word mother to refer to her adoptive mother. So when Mary talks to Suzy about her adoptive mother she is actually referring to her biological mother. Mary and Suzy both use the same word; mother, but the way in which they use it has different extensions. Maybe this is not a good example because the word mother has many different extensions when someone different uses it, but we can think of it in another way, where there is the existence of a twin earth. On twin earth twin- Mary is exactly the same as earthian- Mary along with everything else except the fact that mothers on twin earth are not biologically similar to their children. If Mary was unknowingly switched in her sleep with twin Mary, she would be using the word mother to refer to someone different then she believes. I’m not exactly sure of why these examples show that the contents of beliefs supervene on our internal states. This seems like it is not a stretch to think that your surroundings and what goes on inside you indicate what beliefs you hold. The examples show then that beliefs that seem to be the same belief- type are actually not because they have different content. So, coming from identical people the beliefs are not the same, so there has to be something other than internally that reacts on belief, but can’t we just say that the fact that we think the beliefs are not the same shows that you and twin-you are not exactly the same and therefore it should be expected that you and twin-you’s beliefs wouldn’t be exactly the same? What about two different people placed in the exact same situations and surrounding acting and doing the exact same things and having the exact same internal goings on but in two parallel worlds or universes, should each and every one of their thoughts be the same? This example seems to me to also show that beliefs are caused by internal and external components. The examples just seem to give you what would already seem intuitive.
Sunday, December 2, 2007
Habituals
Williamson wants to argue that (a) counterfactuals are intimately tied up with modality, (b)counterfactual thought plays a pivotal role in our everyday reasoning and consequently (c) a modal epistemology comes along with our everyday reasoning for free. To strengthen his argument he tries to show that we cannot make due without counterfactuals and that we cannot reduce them to anything that breaks their tie to modality. As a particular instance of the latter, Williamson argues that counterfactuals cannot be reduced to “habituals”. He attempts to drive a wedge between the two by producing a case in which a counterfactual has a different truth-value from a parallel habitual. The details of Williamson’s argument are as follows:
Consider the sentences:
(i) If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown just exactly those symptoms which he does in fact show.
(iH) If Jones takes arsenic, he [normally] shows just exactly those symptoms which he does in fact show.
(1) If a situation S can be produced in which (i) and (iH) differ in truth value, then (iH) cannot do the same work (i) does in all situations.
(2) Let S be the case in which Jones’ symptoms are not those he would normally show in arsenic poisoning but those he would show given that he had, unusually, been fasting for the previous 72 hours.
(3) S is a case in which (i) is true when (iH) is false, that is a case in which they differ in truth value.
(4) Thus, (iH) cannot do the same work (i) does in all situations.
Now I don’t know anything about habituals and a fortiori I lack knowledge about habitual semantics. However, I would imagine them to be something like: the habitual conditional A [h]->B is true iff in A circumstances, B normally comes about. This seems to line up with Williamson’s evaluation of (iH) as false. The problem I have is with TWs evaluation of (i) as true under S.
It seems to me that if Jones had taken arsenic he would *not* have shown just exactly those symptoms which he does in fact show under S, since the symptoms in S are *not* those he would normally show in arsenic poisoning but those he would show given that he had, unusually, been fasting for the previous 72 hours.
Even spelling this out in terms of possible world semantics seems to point to the falsity of (i). A non-insane principle is the following: worlds where “normal” situations occur are closer to the actual world than worlds in which “non-normal” situations occur. But given this principle and S, if we go to the closest world where Jones takes arsenic, it is not the case that he exhibits the symptoms he currently exhibits at @ (since the @-symptoms are not arsenic symptoms). Hence, (i) is false.
Williamson is super good at logic, so I’m pretty sure I’m the one in error but I do not currently see how his counterexample works.
Consider the sentences:
(i) If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown just exactly those symptoms which he does in fact show.
(iH) If Jones takes arsenic, he [normally] shows just exactly those symptoms which he does in fact show.
(1) If a situation S can be produced in which (i) and (iH) differ in truth value, then (iH) cannot do the same work (i) does in all situations.
(2) Let S be the case in which Jones’ symptoms are not those he would normally show in arsenic poisoning but those he would show given that he had, unusually, been fasting for the previous 72 hours.
(3) S is a case in which (i) is true when (iH) is false, that is a case in which they differ in truth value.
(4) Thus, (iH) cannot do the same work (i) does in all situations.
Now I don’t know anything about habituals and a fortiori I lack knowledge about habitual semantics. However, I would imagine them to be something like: the habitual conditional A [h]->B is true iff in A circumstances, B normally comes about. This seems to line up with Williamson’s evaluation of (iH) as false. The problem I have is with TWs evaluation of (i) as true under S.
It seems to me that if Jones had taken arsenic he would *not* have shown just exactly those symptoms which he does in fact show under S, since the symptoms in S are *not* those he would normally show in arsenic poisoning but those he would show given that he had, unusually, been fasting for the previous 72 hours.
Even spelling this out in terms of possible world semantics seems to point to the falsity of (i). A non-insane principle is the following: worlds where “normal” situations occur are closer to the actual world than worlds in which “non-normal” situations occur. But given this principle and S, if we go to the closest world where Jones takes arsenic, it is not the case that he exhibits the symptoms he currently exhibits at @ (since the @-symptoms are not arsenic symptoms). Hence, (i) is false.
Williamson is super good at logic, so I’m pretty sure I’m the one in error but I do not currently see how his counterexample works.
Counterpossibles
One objection Williamson considers to his view is that not all counterpossibles are vacuously true. If this is right, then the principle NECESSITY is false:
(NECESSITY) [](A->B)->(A[]->B)
NECESSITY states that if it's necessary that A implies B, then if I were the case then B would be the case. One could hold that the principle fails when A is an impossibility. If A is an impossibility, then trivially in every possible world at which A holds, B also holds (there are no such worlds). However, even so it might still be intelligable (and correct) to say that were A to hold, B would not hold.
Williamson makes a case against this when considering a mathematician doing a reductio argument. His main strategy is to trade off truth for assertibility in such cases. Suppose you're trying to prove fermat's last theorum by using an impossible solution (S) to it to generate absurdity. You can use counter-factual reasoning to assert S []-> A, but can't assert S []->~S for the purposes of your proposed proof. He says this does not tell against the truth of S[]->~S. After all, a contradiction could be used to prove anything eventually, even if it will take more steps.
My concern is that strategies like this won't work for some logics. Suppose para-consistent logics are necessarily not correct. It still seems right to say that if they were correct then certain things would hold, and if they were correct certain other things wouldn't. After all, they're specifically designed to be able to handle such cases.
(NECESSITY) [](A->B)->(A[]->B)
NECESSITY states that if it's necessary that A implies B, then if I were the case then B would be the case. One could hold that the principle fails when A is an impossibility. If A is an impossibility, then trivially in every possible world at which A holds, B also holds (there are no such worlds). However, even so it might still be intelligable (and correct) to say that were A to hold, B would not hold.
Williamson makes a case against this when considering a mathematician doing a reductio argument. His main strategy is to trade off truth for assertibility in such cases. Suppose you're trying to prove fermat's last theorum by using an impossible solution (S) to it to generate absurdity. You can use counter-factual reasoning to assert S []-> A, but can't assert S []->~S for the purposes of your proposed proof. He says this does not tell against the truth of S[]->~S. After all, a contradiction could be used to prove anything eventually, even if it will take more steps.
My concern is that strategies like this won't work for some logics. Suppose para-consistent logics are necessarily not correct. It still seems right to say that if they were correct then certain things would hold, and if they were correct certain other things wouldn't. After all, they're specifically designed to be able to handle such cases.
Sunday, November 25, 2007
Thought Experiments
Something struck me as strange in the Kim rehash of Putnam and Burge’s thought experiments. In describing the earth-born astronaut Jones’ use of ‘water’ Kim says that “[i]f Jones stays on twin earth long enough, we will eventually interpret her word ‘water’ to mean twater [that is XYZ], not water, and attribute to her twater-thoughts rather than water thoughts, although of course it is difficult to say exactly when this change will come about.”
This brings to the fore all kinds of questions about how reference attaches to word meaning and use. As far as I remember, the historical-causal story of how reference fixing works is something like the following: the reference of any name ‘blah’ is fixed by an original user in a “baptism ceremony” which consist of the original user either ostensively or descriptively picking out the object blah and saying ‘blah’. The meaning (including reference) of ‘blah’ is then transmitted to new users of ‘blah’ when they intend to use ‘blah’ as the original user did. In this way, a long historical-causal chain of ‘blah’-use explains the transmission of the meaning along with the reference of the word.
So far so good.
Now let us turn our attention to poor tharthritis having Fred. Presumably, Fred intends to use ‘arthritis’ in the same way that his original community does. Yet, he also presumably knows that people outside of his community also use ‘arthritis’ (since otherwise he would not use ‘arthritis’ when complaining to the doctor); and no doubt also intends to use ‘arthritis’ in the way that the doctor does when he talks to the doctor. But now he intends to use ‘arthritis’ as both his community and the doctor do. On the historical-causal view it is unclear what the word ‘arthritis’ means. Is the extension of his use of ‘arthritis’, arthritis? Is it tharthritis? Is it both!?
One way to disambiguate would be to claim that the meaning of a word W in the mouth of a user X is always the meaning that W first had in X’s mouth unless X consciously corrects his meaning of the word. But if this holds, then it looks like Jones’ use of ‘water’ does not eventually come to mean ‘twater’ as Kim claims.
Another way to disambiguate would be to hold that the meaning of a word W in the mouth of a user X at time t is the meaning that X intends W to have at t (spelled out in an appropriate historical-causal way). But then it appears that Fred’s use of ‘arthritis’ might end up referring to both arthritis and thartritis. If this is true it would certainly be a startling discovery (at least for me). Most semantic theories that I know of only allow words in literal sentences to have single referents.
Of course there might be other ways to disambiguate the meaning of W. Perhaps the meaning of a word W in the mouth of a user X at time t is the meaning that the community C adorns W with. Where C is the community that X spends most of his time in. However, this account has the exact same problem as the second one whenever X has spent *equal* amounts of time in several communities. In any case, it has been interesting reviewing the thought experiments of Putman and Burge.
This brings to the fore all kinds of questions about how reference attaches to word meaning and use. As far as I remember, the historical-causal story of how reference fixing works is something like the following: the reference of any name ‘blah’ is fixed by an original user in a “baptism ceremony” which consist of the original user either ostensively or descriptively picking out the object blah and saying ‘blah’. The meaning (including reference) of ‘blah’ is then transmitted to new users of ‘blah’ when they intend to use ‘blah’ as the original user did. In this way, a long historical-causal chain of ‘blah’-use explains the transmission of the meaning along with the reference of the word.
So far so good.
Now let us turn our attention to poor tharthritis having Fred. Presumably, Fred intends to use ‘arthritis’ in the same way that his original community does. Yet, he also presumably knows that people outside of his community also use ‘arthritis’ (since otherwise he would not use ‘arthritis’ when complaining to the doctor); and no doubt also intends to use ‘arthritis’ in the way that the doctor does when he talks to the doctor. But now he intends to use ‘arthritis’ as both his community and the doctor do. On the historical-causal view it is unclear what the word ‘arthritis’ means. Is the extension of his use of ‘arthritis’, arthritis? Is it tharthritis? Is it both!?
One way to disambiguate would be to claim that the meaning of a word W in the mouth of a user X is always the meaning that W first had in X’s mouth unless X consciously corrects his meaning of the word. But if this holds, then it looks like Jones’ use of ‘water’ does not eventually come to mean ‘twater’ as Kim claims.
Another way to disambiguate would be to hold that the meaning of a word W in the mouth of a user X at time t is the meaning that X intends W to have at t (spelled out in an appropriate historical-causal way). But then it appears that Fred’s use of ‘arthritis’ might end up referring to both arthritis and thartritis. If this is true it would certainly be a startling discovery (at least for me). Most semantic theories that I know of only allow words in literal sentences to have single referents.
Of course there might be other ways to disambiguate the meaning of W. Perhaps the meaning of a word W in the mouth of a user X at time t is the meaning that the community C adorns W with. Where C is the community that X spends most of his time in. However, this account has the exact same problem as the second one whenever X has spent *equal* amounts of time in several communities. In any case, it has been interesting reviewing the thought experiments of Putman and Burge.
This post is on the readings we got from the Philosophy of Mind artsy cut-and-paste handout with the thought experiment examples from Putnam and Burge. Both thought experiments run arguments that favour an account that takes our intentional states (beliefs, desires, etc.) to have wide content. That is that these intentional states are not wholly and correctly responsible for reflecting what our internal sates are (i.e. what's really going on inside our melons). Both arguments run something as follows:
- If it is not the case that our intentional states supervene our internal states, then wide content is the correct account of mental goings on.
- If our intentional states supervene our internal states, then our intentional states wholly and correctly reflect our internal states.
- If our intentional states wholly and correctly reflect our internal states, then the meanings of words we use to express these states are correct.
- It is not the case that the meanings of words we use to express these states are correct.
- So, it is false that our intentional states wholly and correctly reflect our internal states.
- Thus, it is not the case that our intentional states supervene our internal states.
- Therefore, wide content is the correct account of mental goings on.
Premise (1) is definitional as far as wide content goes, so I'll leave it alone.
Premises (5), (6), and (7) are inferential from the other premises, so I'll leave them alone.
Premise (4) is justified through the lovely thought experiments created by Putnam and Burge that show instances where the words we use to express, that is the understanding of the meanings of our expressions, are incomplete or possibly (in the case of the Burge example) defective. But we use them anyhow, even when we know this may be the case. I'll leave this premise alone, because I think we do this. A lot.
Premise (2) and (3) are the tricky ones. (2) I'll agree with because if what it takes (that is the definition of supervene) for one state to supervene on another state is to wholly and correctly reflect that state, then no argument from me. Premise (3) is probably the premise that makes the biggest assumption and thus requires the most justification. An objection could be made that:
If we accept premise (4), then either it is not the case that the meanings of words we use to express these states are correct, or our intentional states wholly and correctly reflect our internal states.
I accept premise (4).
So, either it is not the case that the meanings of words we use to express these states are correct, or our intentional states wholly and correctly reflect our internal states.
This thus implies that, if the meanings of words we use to express these states are correct, then our intentional states wholly and correctly reflect our internal states.
This seems okay to me. When we use words, via expressions to express things, it is if the words are correct that we then say that they are expressing the right state. If we use the wrong words via expressions then we don't say that they express the right state, furthermore we don't say that when we get the words wrong, that is use the wrong expression, that it is the fault, or that there is some sort of incorrect reflection of what is going with the states inside our heads that make this happen. We are just getting the words wrong. This is undoubtedly not a great example, but ... say I express the sentence "I am the king of the world!". To claim that my misstep in expression, i.e. that I am using the wrong words like being a king when I darn well know that kings are male (n.b. and I am not) and that kings do not rule the whole world, means that my intentional sates are incorrectly reflecting my internal states, is bunk. Even if I was unaware of the correct definition of what a king is or what it feels like to be the one of the whole world, does not mean that I am incorrectly attributing my expression to some feeling of grandiose and regal superiority. In short, the entailment between expressions and intentional / internal states, used in favour of defending wide mental content vs. narrow content, I believe (ha!) is far too high of an infallibility standard to put expressions up to.
Williamson’s argument for rejecting UAt and UDAt:
(1) Every vixen is a vixen.
UAt: Necessarily, whoever grasps the thought every vixen is a vixen assents to it.
UDAt: Necessarily, whoever grasps the thought every vixen is a vixen has a disposition to assent to it.
Williamson wants to know if we can maintain UAt or UDAt while acknowledging UA1 and UDA1 fails by the Stephen and Peter counterexample.
(2) Stephen assents to (1) if and only if he assents to the though every vixen is a vixen.
(3) He doesn’t assent to (1) so he doesn’t assent to the thought every vixen is a vixen.
(4) It follows that if t is the thought every vixen is a vixen then Stephen doesn’t assent to the thought every vixen is a vixen and is also a counterexample to UAt.
(5) If the thought that he associates with the sentence ‘Every vixen is a vixen’ is not the thought every vixen is a vixen then he is not a counterexample
(6) Using the word ‘thought’ indicates that inferential differences between Peter and Stephen and us represent differences between the thoughts we associate with (1). Peter and Stephen associate different thoughts then our own when assenting to (1).
(7) If (6), then we should translate their idiolects non-homophonically into ours.
(8) A translation scheme would invoke refusal to acknowledge the full challenge which Peter and Stephen have issued to (1).
(9) To claim (6) then the disagreement between Peter and Stephen and us sounds less threatening because it bundles together logical and semantic differences without unification.
(10) So, the links from understanding to assent and dispositions to assent fail for thought like they do for language.
For reasons other than (8) I think (6) fails because it separates thought from language. If this should be the case then the thought someone associates with a sentence isn’t just the thought of that sentence. This seems kind of strange to accept. I think Williamsons argument for failing UAt and UDAt is a good one.
(1) Every vixen is a vixen.
UAt: Necessarily, whoever grasps the thought every vixen is a vixen assents to it.
UDAt: Necessarily, whoever grasps the thought every vixen is a vixen has a disposition to assent to it.
Williamson wants to know if we can maintain UAt or UDAt while acknowledging UA1 and UDA1 fails by the Stephen and Peter counterexample.
(2) Stephen assents to (1) if and only if he assents to the though every vixen is a vixen.
(3) He doesn’t assent to (1) so he doesn’t assent to the thought every vixen is a vixen.
(4) It follows that if t is the thought every vixen is a vixen then Stephen doesn’t assent to the thought every vixen is a vixen and is also a counterexample to UAt.
(5) If the thought that he associates with the sentence ‘Every vixen is a vixen’ is not the thought every vixen is a vixen then he is not a counterexample
(6) Using the word ‘thought’ indicates that inferential differences between Peter and Stephen and us represent differences between the thoughts we associate with (1). Peter and Stephen associate different thoughts then our own when assenting to (1).
(7) If (6), then we should translate their idiolects non-homophonically into ours.
(8) A translation scheme would invoke refusal to acknowledge the full challenge which Peter and Stephen have issued to (1).
(9) To claim (6) then the disagreement between Peter and Stephen and us sounds less threatening because it bundles together logical and semantic differences without unification.
(10) So, the links from understanding to assent and dispositions to assent fail for thought like they do for language.
For reasons other than (8) I think (6) fails because it separates thought from language. If this should be the case then the thought someone associates with a sentence isn’t just the thought of that sentence. This seems kind of strange to accept. I think Williamsons argument for failing UAt and UDAt is a good one.
Saturday, November 24, 2007
In chapter 4 Williamson argues against the understanding-truth link. He argues that for the understanding-truth link to hold it would have to be the case that Black and Rutherford either did not understand their own theory or that the theory is true. Since it has been proven that the phlogiston theory is false, it would seem that the only way to save the understanding-truth link we would have to say that Black and Rutherford did not understand their own theory. Clearly it is false that Black and Rutherford did not understand their own theory. The argument goes as follows:
1. If the understanding-truth links hold for phlogiston sentences, then either
Black and Rutherford did not understand their own theory or the theory
is true.
2. ~ (Black and Rutherford did not understand phlogiston theory & phlogiston
theory is true.)
3. ~ Understanding-truth links hold for phlogiston theory.
However, one may argue that premise 2. is false. One may argue that one of the disjuncts are true, namely, phlogiston is true. This disjunct maybe true if we replace the core of phlogiston theory with the conditional ‘If phlogiston exists then the core of phlogiston theory is true. Williamson dismisses this argument stating “Arguably, however, since ‘phlogiston’ fails to refer, that conditional too fails to express a proposition, so even this more cautions sentence is not true, although it is also not false.” (P. 11 chap 4)
I believe there are two things wrong with this. First, he states “Arguably, however, since ‘phlogiston’ fails to refer” that the conditional fails to have a truth value. This statement is arguable. There are theories that hold that abstract objects have truth values.
Second, even if we concede that it does not have a truth value just because this conditional fails to have a truth value does not mean that the conditional is false, which is what Williamson needs to make his claim that understanding-truth links do not hold. Since Williamson is the one who wants to argue that nothing is epistemically available simply on the basis of linguistic and conceptual competence then the onus of proof is on him if he wishes to accomplish this.
1. If the understanding-truth links hold for phlogiston sentences, then either
Black and Rutherford did not understand their own theory or the theory
is true.
2. ~ (Black and Rutherford did not understand phlogiston theory & phlogiston
theory is true.)
3. ~ Understanding-truth links hold for phlogiston theory.
However, one may argue that premise 2. is false. One may argue that one of the disjuncts are true, namely, phlogiston is true. This disjunct maybe true if we replace the core of phlogiston theory with the conditional ‘If phlogiston exists then the core of phlogiston theory is true. Williamson dismisses this argument stating “Arguably, however, since ‘phlogiston’ fails to refer, that conditional too fails to express a proposition, so even this more cautions sentence is not true, although it is also not false.” (P. 11 chap 4)
I believe there are two things wrong with this. First, he states “Arguably, however, since ‘phlogiston’ fails to refer” that the conditional fails to have a truth value. This statement is arguable. There are theories that hold that abstract objects have truth values.
Second, even if we concede that it does not have a truth value just because this conditional fails to have a truth value does not mean that the conditional is false, which is what Williamson needs to make his claim that understanding-truth links do not hold. Since Williamson is the one who wants to argue that nothing is epistemically available simply on the basis of linguistic and conceptual competence then the onus of proof is on him if he wishes to accomplish this.
Monday, November 19, 2007
Sorry this is late,
Analytic truths are less substantial then synthetic truths because they impose no constraint on the world.
They do impose a constraint on the world; the recipe for truth is that truth depends on (a) what is expressed and (b) whether things actually are that way.
1. All vixens are female foxes.
1 is true because vixens are female foxes but does this impose a constraint on the world? It should be the case that in the world all vixens are female foxes. But what if all foxes were extinct? It should still be the case that if they did exist in the world then all vixens would be female foxes.
So analytic truths are not less substantial then synthetic truths rather there is little difference betweent them.
Understanding words in a language is just the ability to use them to interact well with other members of the community, in social practice.
Frege- analyticity: Frege- analytic sentences are logical truths or truths that can be turned into logical truths by replacing synonyms for synonyms.
2. All vixens are vixens
is a logical truth.
Vixen and female fox are synonymous so it follows that
1. All vixens are female foxes
is also a logical truth.
The problem that arises is when someone is not correct in their understanding of a word. There can be a case where a person makes a mistake in the definition of a word. So it could be the case that someone misunderstands that vixens are also immature male foxes and so believes 2 without believing in 1.
There is also a problem when words are not used in ways where synonyms can be replaced, like bachelor of arts degree. But a solution is that we take bachelor of arts degree as one whole word or concept instead of breaking it down further.
Analytic truths are less substantial then synthetic truths because they impose no constraint on the world.
They do impose a constraint on the world; the recipe for truth is that truth depends on (a) what is expressed and (b) whether things actually are that way.
1. All vixens are female foxes.
1 is true because vixens are female foxes but does this impose a constraint on the world? It should be the case that in the world all vixens are female foxes. But what if all foxes were extinct? It should still be the case that if they did exist in the world then all vixens would be female foxes.
So analytic truths are not less substantial then synthetic truths rather there is little difference betweent them.
Understanding words in a language is just the ability to use them to interact well with other members of the community, in social practice.
Frege- analyticity: Frege- analytic sentences are logical truths or truths that can be turned into logical truths by replacing synonyms for synonyms.
2. All vixens are vixens
is a logical truth.
Vixen and female fox are synonymous so it follows that
1. All vixens are female foxes
is also a logical truth.
The problem that arises is when someone is not correct in their understanding of a word. There can be a case where a person makes a mistake in the definition of a word. So it could be the case that someone misunderstands that vixens are also immature male foxes and so believes 2 without believing in 1.
There is also a problem when words are not used in ways where synonyms can be replaced, like bachelor of arts degree. But a solution is that we take bachelor of arts degree as one whole word or concept instead of breaking it down further.
Sunday, November 18, 2007
Sorry this is a bit of a back-up from Chapter 4's recent posts, to section 8. where TW is talking about what exactly is a shared language, and how exactly they (or it) is possible.
How about 2.? The antecedent seems to be fine for the reasons given above for 1. and 6. But the consequent is a little odd, if not false. A disjunction does not seem à propos in this instance (in all fairness perhaps it is my reconstruction of what is going on, but this does seem to be the way TW is setting things up). Rather, having a mutual similarity of constituents is a feature of the complex interrelations of those constituents.
- If there is something that binds together the common practice of using a word with a given meaning, then there is a shared understanding of that word.
- If there is a shared understanding of that word, then there is either a mutual similarity of the constituents or it is the complex interrelations of the constituents.
- So, if there is something that binds together the common practice of using a word with a given meaning, then the something is either a mutual similarity of the constituents or the something is the complex interrelations of the constituents.
- It is not the case that the something is a mutual similarity of the constituents.
- Thus, if there is something that binds together the common practice of using a word with a given meaning, then the something is the complex interrelations of the constituents.
- There is something that binds together the common practice of using a word with a given meaning.
- Therefore, the something is the complex interrelations of the constituents.
TW proposes that the something which is the complex interrelations of the constituents, is above all the constituent's causal interrelations. And that “the idea that a shared understanding of a word requires a shared stock of platitudes depends on the assumption that uses of a word by different agents or at different times can be bound together into a common practice of using that word with a given meaning only by an invariant core of beliefs.” So, the something is an invariant core of beliefs (foreshadow moment, I think... not JBs, not JTBs, no esatblishing the entailment links between UA, UK, UJ or UT. Just plain old beliefs / knowledge. Like I said not sure).
The premises that stick out here are 1., 2., 4., and 6.
How about 1. and 6.? Though perhaps wishful and hopeful, the truth of premises 1. and 6. are hard to resist. If there isn't some sort of something that binds the my use and meaning of words (or terms) with those of my fellow man. Well frankly I'm sunk, and so is everyone else. To deny either of these two would invite skepticism about a binding theory of meaning and usage. Bad.
How about 4.? The conditions placed on having a mutual similarity of the constituents, is that they have “some invariant feature, shared by all the constituents and somehow prior to the complex as a whole.” To be fair TW qualifies these conditions by stating that this feature almost never occurs. So, even if a strict cataloging were to take place and this feature was found to occur amongst constituents some of the time, this would still not yield the widespread commonalities within usage and meaning that seem so apparent.How about 2.? The antecedent seems to be fine for the reasons given above for 1. and 6. But the consequent is a little odd, if not false. A disjunction does not seem à propos in this instance (in all fairness perhaps it is my reconstruction of what is going on, but this does seem to be the way TW is setting things up). Rather, having a mutual similarity of constituents is a feature of the complex interrelations of those constituents.
KUt' - Round II
As I understand it, the objective of chapters 3 and 4 is to test out the idea that the methodology of philosophy consists in something like searching for analytic truths and that the linguistic/conceptual-turners can take refuge in this fact on the grounds that analytic truths are linguistic or conceptual in some sense.
I was with Williamson in chapter 4 right up until the end where he argues against KUt’ (i.e. whoever knows …insert epistemic-analytic true thought here… in the normal way does so on the basis of their grasp of the thought).
Here is my formulation of Williamson’s argument:
(1) Either ‘their grasp of the thought’ in KUt’ can be taken in a thick way or in a thin way.
(2) If we take ‘grasping’ in the thick way (i.e. on the basis of the facts underlying the grasping), then grasping depends on knowledge that is not conceptual.
(3) If KUt’ is taken in a way that doesn’t depend on conceptual knowledge, then it will not help the conceptual-turner any.
(4) If we take ‘grasping’ in the thin way (i.e. on the mere fact that the thought in question has been grasped), then there is no way in which grasping is a basis for knowing in any useful sense.
(5) If KUt’ is taken in a way that makes it epistemologically useless, then it will not help the conceptual-turner any.
(6) If (1)-(5), then (7).
(7) KUt’ will not help the conceptual-turner any.
Ignoring the sloppy grammar in my formulation of Williamson’s argument, I think that (4) is false. There is still an important way in which ‘grasping’ in the thin sense is a useful basis for knowing. Namely, such grasping is a useful basis for knowing in cases where the truths are so thin, fundamental and basic that there can be no other way to explain our knowledge of them. These cases include truths of logic and truths about truth. To be sure, these are truths about the way the world is. But I’m sure Williamson would agree that we do not come to know about them by coming to know about the world – we come to know them merely by having grasped them.
Despite this point, I think that to restrict the role of philosophy only to the study of these “thin” truths is to place too strong a constraint on philosophy, so the conceptual-turner is not saved by resorting to this line of reasoning.
I was with Williamson in chapter 4 right up until the end where he argues against KUt’ (i.e. whoever knows …insert epistemic-analytic true thought here… in the normal way does so on the basis of their grasp of the thought).
Here is my formulation of Williamson’s argument:
(1) Either ‘their grasp of the thought’ in KUt’ can be taken in a thick way or in a thin way.
(2) If we take ‘grasping’ in the thick way (i.e. on the basis of the facts underlying the grasping), then grasping depends on knowledge that is not conceptual.
(3) If KUt’ is taken in a way that doesn’t depend on conceptual knowledge, then it will not help the conceptual-turner any.
(4) If we take ‘grasping’ in the thin way (i.e. on the mere fact that the thought in question has been grasped), then there is no way in which grasping is a basis for knowing in any useful sense.
(5) If KUt’ is taken in a way that makes it epistemologically useless, then it will not help the conceptual-turner any.
(6) If (1)-(5), then (7).
(7) KUt’ will not help the conceptual-turner any.
Ignoring the sloppy grammar in my formulation of Williamson’s argument, I think that (4) is false. There is still an important way in which ‘grasping’ in the thin sense is a useful basis for knowing. Namely, such grasping is a useful basis for knowing in cases where the truths are so thin, fundamental and basic that there can be no other way to explain our knowledge of them. These cases include truths of logic and truths about truth. To be sure, these are truths about the way the world is. But I’m sure Williamson would agree that we do not come to know about them by coming to know about the world – we come to know them merely by having grasped them.
Despite this point, I think that to restrict the role of philosophy only to the study of these “thin” truths is to place too strong a constraint on philosophy, so the conceptual-turner is not saved by resorting to this line of reasoning.
KUt' whoever knows every vixen is a vixen in the normal way does so simply on the basis of their grasp of the thought
Williamson says that there are two ways to take this, a thin way and a thick way. According to the thin way the mere fact that the person grasps the thought provides an epistemic justification. According to the thick way it's the facts that constitute the grasp of the thought that provides the epistemic lift.
Williamson's argument against the thick way there's alot more to understanding the thought involved than just semantic or linguistic considerations. Many of these are in nature not conceptual or linguistic, such as the factors that add to your competence with an expression (rather than knowledge of its meaning). If the conceptual turner wants something to go on here, she needs epistemic justification that comes from merely linguistic or conceptual material.
The thought I had was that if these are genuinly the considerations necessary for grasping a thought, then they are conceptual considerations. The conceptual turner isn't dead in the water, it's just that the conceptual material she thought she was working with turned out to be a little different.
On the other hand, if all these considerations (previously thought not to be about thought or language) turn out to be conceptual, then any use for the distinction the conceptual turner needs is dissolved. Analytic thoughts or sentences don't really have any special epistemic status in virtue of being conceptual.
Williamson says that there are two ways to take this, a thin way and a thick way. According to the thin way the mere fact that the person grasps the thought provides an epistemic justification. According to the thick way it's the facts that constitute the grasp of the thought that provides the epistemic lift.
Williamson's argument against the thick way there's alot more to understanding the thought involved than just semantic or linguistic considerations. Many of these are in nature not conceptual or linguistic, such as the factors that add to your competence with an expression (rather than knowledge of its meaning). If the conceptual turner wants something to go on here, she needs epistemic justification that comes from merely linguistic or conceptual material.
The thought I had was that if these are genuinly the considerations necessary for grasping a thought, then they are conceptual considerations. The conceptual turner isn't dead in the water, it's just that the conceptual material she thought she was working with turned out to be a little different.
On the other hand, if all these considerations (previously thought not to be about thought or language) turn out to be conceptual, then any use for the distinction the conceptual turner needs is dissolved. Analytic thoughts or sentences don't really have any special epistemic status in virtue of being conceptual.
Tuesday, November 6, 2007
Paper Review Guidelines
Here are some guidelines to help you give good feedback:
- The introduction should be clear and to the point. It should make clear what the thesis of the paper is and it should say what the paper is going to do.
- Typically, the first section after the introduction will be an explanation of the view in the target paper. The explanation of the view should be clear; if there's something about the view your peer is focusing on that does not make sense to you, say so! The explanation of the target view should make sense to someone at your level in philosophy who has not read the target paper and is not in our class. So, for instance, you don't need to explain what 'valid' means but you should take time to explain key technical terms or ideas that are not common currency in philosophy.
- The paper should contain an argument that your peer has extracted from the target paper. It should be the main argument your peer is focusing on. It should be presented in numbered premise-conclusion form and it should be valid. It should not just come out of nowhere. A good way to set up an extracted argument is to informally explain the "gist" of the argument in the target paper and say "we can set out/present/state the argument more clearly as follows:
1. Premise
2. Premise
3. Conclusion"
It should be completely clear why there is a numbered list in your paper and what that numbered list is supposed to be.
- The paper should explain and defend the premises in the extracted argument. Spend time saying a bit in favour of the premises of the argument and make sure to define any technical terms. What you're trying to do here is to get the reader to see what can be said on behalf of the premises in the argument you'll criticize. As always, be explicit about what you're doing. Don't just launch into reasons for accepting the premises; tell the reader what you're doing and be explicit about which premises you're discussing.
- The paper should present an objection in numbered premise-conclusion form. The objection must be valid and it must deny a premise in the first argument. The argument should not just be "dropped into" the paper. Introduce your argument. You can follow the strategy of informally explaining your idea and presenting it more formally as a valid objection.
- The objection should be explained/defended. Same as for the original argument.
- The paper should consider a reply to the objection. Which premise in the objection might the author of the target paper reject and why? Be specific about which premise in the objection is being called into question. (Hint: This is easier to do if you don't use the same numbers for the premises in your extracted argument and your objection. So don't start both with '1', for instance.)
- The paper should contain an overall evaluation. Is the objection sound? Why or why not?
Throughout, assume that the reader is lazy, mean, and stupid. Lazy: The reader does not want to have to think. You do the thinking and spell it all out in your paper. Don't make the reader have to work. Mean: If what you write can be taken in more than one way, assume that the reader will take it in the least charitable way. Correct for this by avoiding any looseness and disambiguating important ambiguities. Stupid: Your reader will not "get" what you are saying. Spell it out in detail.
Remember, your job as peer reviewer is to help your peer improve her/his paper. So don't be shy about saying that you didn't understand something, that there's a gap in the reasoning, that a better defence can be provided for a particular premise, etc. As always you should be polite and respectful, but you're not doing your peer any favors if you just say everything is fine as is. As with the previous reviews, you're strongly encouraged to talk to each other about the paper. After all, that's the fun part: discussing an interesting philosophical issue with someone smart. So have fun with it and make sure to give your peer as much help as you can.
- The introduction should be clear and to the point. It should make clear what the thesis of the paper is and it should say what the paper is going to do.
- Typically, the first section after the introduction will be an explanation of the view in the target paper. The explanation of the view should be clear; if there's something about the view your peer is focusing on that does not make sense to you, say so! The explanation of the target view should make sense to someone at your level in philosophy who has not read the target paper and is not in our class. So, for instance, you don't need to explain what 'valid' means but you should take time to explain key technical terms or ideas that are not common currency in philosophy.
- The paper should contain an argument that your peer has extracted from the target paper. It should be the main argument your peer is focusing on. It should be presented in numbered premise-conclusion form and it should be valid. It should not just come out of nowhere. A good way to set up an extracted argument is to informally explain the "gist" of the argument in the target paper and say "we can set out/present/state the argument more clearly as follows:
1. Premise
2. Premise
3. Conclusion"
It should be completely clear why there is a numbered list in your paper and what that numbered list is supposed to be.
- The paper should explain and defend the premises in the extracted argument. Spend time saying a bit in favour of the premises of the argument and make sure to define any technical terms. What you're trying to do here is to get the reader to see what can be said on behalf of the premises in the argument you'll criticize. As always, be explicit about what you're doing. Don't just launch into reasons for accepting the premises; tell the reader what you're doing and be explicit about which premises you're discussing.
- The paper should present an objection in numbered premise-conclusion form. The objection must be valid and it must deny a premise in the first argument. The argument should not just be "dropped into" the paper. Introduce your argument. You can follow the strategy of informally explaining your idea and presenting it more formally as a valid objection.
- The objection should be explained/defended. Same as for the original argument.
- The paper should consider a reply to the objection. Which premise in the objection might the author of the target paper reject and why? Be specific about which premise in the objection is being called into question. (Hint: This is easier to do if you don't use the same numbers for the premises in your extracted argument and your objection. So don't start both with '1', for instance.)
- The paper should contain an overall evaluation. Is the objection sound? Why or why not?
Throughout, assume that the reader is lazy, mean, and stupid. Lazy: The reader does not want to have to think. You do the thinking and spell it all out in your paper. Don't make the reader have to work. Mean: If what you write can be taken in more than one way, assume that the reader will take it in the least charitable way. Correct for this by avoiding any looseness and disambiguating important ambiguities. Stupid: Your reader will not "get" what you are saying. Spell it out in detail.
Remember, your job as peer reviewer is to help your peer improve her/his paper. So don't be shy about saying that you didn't understand something, that there's a gap in the reasoning, that a better defence can be provided for a particular premise, etc. As always you should be polite and respectful, but you're not doing your peer any favors if you just say everything is fine as is. As with the previous reviews, you're strongly encouraged to talk to each other about the paper. After all, that's the fun part: discussing an interesting philosophical issue with someone smart. So have fun with it and make sure to give your peer as much help as you can.
Saturday, November 3, 2007
Justin D's Chapter 4 Post:
In chapter four, Williamson argues against those who try hold onto philosophical exceptionalism by defending epistemic analyticity. One of these arguments in particular is focused on rejecting the construal of epistemic analyticity in terms of (UAl’LRule): necessarily, whoever understands the meaning of the logical particles contained in a logical rule assents to that rule. This is supposed to be a case where (the UAl’ version of) epistemic analyticity is on its firmest footing. If Williamson can successfully argue against cases like these, it’s back to the drawing board for defenders of epistemic analyticity. He argues as follows:
1. If there is someone who understands the meaning of the logical particles that occur within a rule but dissents from that rule, then there is a counterexample to (UAl’LRule).
2. If there is a counterexample to (UAl’LRule), then (UAl’LRule) fails.
3. McGee is someone who understands the meaning of logical particles that occur within modus ponens (MP) but dissents from MP.
4. If (3), then there is a counterexample to (UAl’LRule).
5. If (3) and (4), then (6) (UAl’LRule) fails.
6. (UAl’LRule) fails.
I would now like to canvass opinions on the following Weathersonian counterargument to Williamson:
7. “[T]he meaning of a denoting term is the most natural object, property or relation that satisfies most of our usage dispositions” (Weatherson, 2003: 23).
8. If (7), then one can be a competent language user and also be wrong about the meaning of a denoting term, in the case where one's dispositions to use the term fail to coincide with the most natural object, property or relation in the vicinity of said disposition.
9. If (7) and (8), then (10).
10. If X’s disposition to use a term t fails to coincide with the most natural object, property or relation in the vicinity of t, then X is wrong about the meaning of t but can still be a competent language user.
11. McGee’s disposition to use ‘if’ fails to coincide with the most natural object, property or relation in the vicinity of ‘if. (Since, the most natural meaning of ‘if’ is the classical meaning of ‘if’).
12. If (10) and (11), then (13).
13. McGee could still be a competent language user but McGee is wrong about the meaning of ‘if’.
14. If McGee and those with parallel intuitions are wrong about the meaning of ‘if’, then it would be unsurprising that they deny MP and their denial of MP would not count as a counterexample to (UAl’LRule).
15. If (13) and (14), then (16) the McGee counterexample to (UAl’LRule) fails.
16. The McGee counterexample to (UAl’LRule) fails.
Moreover, if a strategy of this sort works in this case, then it will also work against some of Williamson’s other arguments against an epistemological conception of analyticity.
Does anyone buy this argument? Why or why not?
In my opinion Weatherson’s theory of meaning puts too much weight on naturalness, especially given that he takes naturalness to be basic/irreducible. Does his theory of meaning license too much? Can we get clear enough on what it is for something to be more natural than something else in order make use of his theory?
1. If there is someone who understands the meaning of the logical particles that occur within a rule but dissents from that rule, then there is a counterexample to (UAl’LRule).
2. If there is a counterexample to (UAl’LRule), then (UAl’LRule) fails.
3. McGee is someone who understands the meaning of logical particles that occur within modus ponens (MP) but dissents from MP.
4. If (3), then there is a counterexample to (UAl’LRule).
5. If (3) and (4), then (6) (UAl’LRule) fails.
6. (UAl’LRule) fails.
I would now like to canvass opinions on the following Weathersonian counterargument to Williamson:
7. “[T]he meaning of a denoting term is the most natural object, property or relation that satisfies most of our usage dispositions” (Weatherson, 2003: 23).
8. If (7), then one can be a competent language user and also be wrong about the meaning of a denoting term, in the case where one's dispositions to use the term fail to coincide with the most natural object, property or relation in the vicinity of said disposition.
9. If (7) and (8), then (10).
10. If X’s disposition to use a term t fails to coincide with the most natural object, property or relation in the vicinity of t, then X is wrong about the meaning of t but can still be a competent language user.
11. McGee’s disposition to use ‘if’ fails to coincide with the most natural object, property or relation in the vicinity of ‘if. (Since, the most natural meaning of ‘if’ is the classical meaning of ‘if’).
12. If (10) and (11), then (13).
13. McGee could still be a competent language user but McGee is wrong about the meaning of ‘if’.
14. If McGee and those with parallel intuitions are wrong about the meaning of ‘if’, then it would be unsurprising that they deny MP and their denial of MP would not count as a counterexample to (UAl’LRule).
15. If (13) and (14), then (16) the McGee counterexample to (UAl’LRule) fails.
16. The McGee counterexample to (UAl’LRule) fails.
Moreover, if a strategy of this sort works in this case, then it will also work against some of Williamson’s other arguments against an epistemological conception of analyticity.
Does anyone buy this argument? Why or why not?
In my opinion Weatherson’s theory of meaning puts too much weight on naturalness, especially given that he takes naturalness to be basic/irreducible. Does his theory of meaning license too much? Can we get clear enough on what it is for something to be more natural than something else in order make use of his theory?
Williamson Chapter 4
Understanding-assent link: our sheer linguistic and conceptual competence mandates assent to some sentences or thoughts and inferences
A logical truth is (1) Every Vixen is a Vixen
Sentence (1) can be written as a understanding-assent link as UA1.
UA1: Necessarily, whoever understands the sentence ‘Every vixen is a vixen’ assents to it.
Is UA1 true? If UA1 is true then an armchair methodology of philosophy is based on understanding-assent links.
Williamson’s counterexample is a situation in which a person, A, given sentence (1) infers that (1) entails
(2) There is at least one Vixen
Person A does this through seemingly logical thought, with very good reasons for his belief’s etc.
In this case person A, for background reasons which can be endlessly thought up, denies (2), and so it follows that he also denies (1).
Because A doesn’t assent to (1), under the claim UA1, person A doesn’t understand (1). This seems wrong because a in the situation described person A seems to understand (1) but by some belief of a mistaken theory, or because of certain background belief bred into person A, he doesn’t accept (2).
Williamson claims then that UA1 is false and because of this example nothing is epistemically available only on the bases of linguistic and conceptual competence.
I don’t think this counterexample is very good because it seems as though UA1 has not been proven false because it shouldn’t matter what a person’s view on the matter is when some of their other views are clearly mistaken, no matter how smart or intellectual you imagine them to be. It seems unrealistic that someone denies a logical truth.
Maybe this is too harsh a reading of Williamson, I just didn’t think his example was very convincing.
Understanding-assent link: our sheer linguistic and conceptual competence mandates assent to some sentences or thoughts and inferences
A logical truth is (1) Every Vixen is a Vixen
Sentence (1) can be written as a understanding-assent link as UA1.
UA1: Necessarily, whoever understands the sentence ‘Every vixen is a vixen’ assents to it.
Is UA1 true? If UA1 is true then an armchair methodology of philosophy is based on understanding-assent links.
Williamson’s counterexample is a situation in which a person, A, given sentence (1) infers that (1) entails
(2) There is at least one Vixen
Person A does this through seemingly logical thought, with very good reasons for his belief’s etc.
In this case person A, for background reasons which can be endlessly thought up, denies (2), and so it follows that he also denies (1).
Because A doesn’t assent to (1), under the claim UA1, person A doesn’t understand (1). This seems wrong because a in the situation described person A seems to understand (1) but by some belief of a mistaken theory, or because of certain background belief bred into person A, he doesn’t accept (2).
Williamson claims then that UA1 is false and because of this example nothing is epistemically available only on the bases of linguistic and conceptual competence.
I don’t think this counterexample is very good because it seems as though UA1 has not been proven false because it shouldn’t matter what a person’s view on the matter is when some of their other views are clearly mistaken, no matter how smart or intellectual you imagine them to be. It seems unrealistic that someone denies a logical truth.
Maybe this is too harsh a reading of Williamson, I just didn’t think his example was very convincing.
Sunday, October 28, 2007
I think I get what Williamson's overall picture is behind chapter 3.
Williamson argues against Quine, who would deny the synthetic analytic distinction altogether. What I gather from chapter 3 is that Williamson wants to claim the disjunction of (1) and (2).
1) not all philosophical truths are analytic
2) analytic truths are no less substantial (informative about the world) than synthetic ones
If either (1) or (2) is right than philosophical discoveries are no less substantial than any other discovery. So I take this chapter to be a revolt against philosophical exceptionalism about subject matter.
Seperately, he seems to endorse the disjunction of (1) and (3).
3) analytic truths are not known in any special way in virtue of being analytic
If either (1) or (3) is right then the way we investigate philosophical truths is not necessarily different from the way we investigate any other truths. So I take this point to be a revolt against philosophical exceptionalism about method.
He goes on to argue this (though in what appears to be a sort of jumbled way) about modal analyticity, frege-analyticity and direct reference-analyticity. But generally, as pointed out in the chapter, Kripke has a good defense:
A) ~ (analyticity -> necessity)
B) if (A) then (C)
C) (2)
and
D) ~(analyticity -> a-prioricity)
E) if (D) then (F)
F) (3)
One could deny (B) and (E), but that seems odd. It seems like one motivation for claiming analyticity has a special metaphysical status (of not informative about the world) is because of its correlation with necessity, ditto for its epistemological status and a-prioricity.
Williamson argues against Quine, who would deny the synthetic analytic distinction altogether. What I gather from chapter 3 is that Williamson wants to claim the disjunction of (1) and (2).
1) not all philosophical truths are analytic
2) analytic truths are no less substantial (informative about the world) than synthetic ones
If either (1) or (2) is right than philosophical discoveries are no less substantial than any other discovery. So I take this chapter to be a revolt against philosophical exceptionalism about subject matter.
Seperately, he seems to endorse the disjunction of (1) and (3).
3) analytic truths are not known in any special way in virtue of being analytic
If either (1) or (3) is right then the way we investigate philosophical truths is not necessarily different from the way we investigate any other truths. So I take this point to be a revolt against philosophical exceptionalism about method.
He goes on to argue this (though in what appears to be a sort of jumbled way) about modal analyticity, frege-analyticity and direct reference-analyticity. But generally, as pointed out in the chapter, Kripke has a good defense:
A) ~ (analyticity -> necessity)
B) if (A) then (C)
C) (2)
and
D) ~(analyticity -> a-prioricity)
E) if (D) then (F)
F) (3)
One could deny (B) and (E), but that seems odd. It seems like one motivation for claiming analyticity has a special metaphysical status (of not informative about the world) is because of its correlation with necessity, ditto for its epistemological status and a-prioricity.
Friday, October 26, 2007
In the third chapter Williamson argues that it is false that analytic truths differ from synthetic ones by being true ‘in virtue of meaning’. For Williamson the intended contrast is that synthetic truths are true because a) they mean what they do and b) things are as the meaning requires. However, analytic truths need only to satisfy a) to be true. Williamson believes analytic truths need to also satisfy a) and b) to be true. Williamson believes that if analytic truths are true by only satisfying a) then it is only because we take b) for granted. Williamson claims that “[i]t is no good to say “Never mind whether barristers are lawyers; ‘Barristers are lawyers’ is true simply because it means that barristers are lawyers”.”
1. If analytic truths are true only because a) they mean what they do then ‘barristers are lawyers’ is true simply because it means that barristers are lawyers.
2. ~ Barristers are lawyers’ is true simply because it means that barristers are lawyers.
3. :. ~ Analytic truths are true only because a) they mean what they do.I believe premise 2. is false. The reasons given in support for 2. are that Williamson claims that we take b) for granted and says it is no good to do that. However, b) is not doing anything in the case of analytic truths. For synthetic truths such as ‘Barbara is a barrister’ a) supplies the meaning and b) confirms if the meaning is the case. b) does not confirm if the supplied meaning is the meaning of ‘Barbara is a barrister’. However, for a synthetic truth such as ‘Barristers are lawyers’ a) supplies the meaning again and b) confirms if the meaning is the meaning. Thus ‘Barristers are lawyers’ is true because a) ‘Barristers are lawyers’ means that barristers are a kind of lawyer who are people who have a law degree and passed the bar exam, are lawyers, who are people who have a law degree and passed the bar exam and b) confirms if it is the case that ‘Barristers are lawyers’ means that barristers are a kind of lawyer who are people who have a law degree and passed the bar exam, are lawyers, who are people who have a law degree and passed the bar exam. For synthetic truth b) need not confirm if the meaning (a)) is true, it simply confirms if a) is the case. But, for analytic truths b) simply confirm a) is true, though a) is already claiming to be true. Barrister means lawyer. Consequently analytic truths are true only because a) they mean what they do, which makes 2. false
1. If analytic truths are true only because a) they mean what they do then ‘barristers are lawyers’ is true simply because it means that barristers are lawyers.
2. ~ Barristers are lawyers’ is true simply because it means that barristers are lawyers.
3. :. ~ Analytic truths are true only because a) they mean what they do.I believe premise 2. is false. The reasons given in support for 2. are that Williamson claims that we take b) for granted and says it is no good to do that. However, b) is not doing anything in the case of analytic truths. For synthetic truths such as ‘Barbara is a barrister’ a) supplies the meaning and b) confirms if the meaning is the case. b) does not confirm if the supplied meaning is the meaning of ‘Barbara is a barrister’. However, for a synthetic truth such as ‘Barristers are lawyers’ a) supplies the meaning again and b) confirms if the meaning is the meaning. Thus ‘Barristers are lawyers’ is true because a) ‘Barristers are lawyers’ means that barristers are a kind of lawyer who are people who have a law degree and passed the bar exam, are lawyers, who are people who have a law degree and passed the bar exam and b) confirms if it is the case that ‘Barristers are lawyers’ means that barristers are a kind of lawyer who are people who have a law degree and passed the bar exam, are lawyers, who are people who have a law degree and passed the bar exam. For synthetic truth b) need not confirm if the meaning (a)) is true, it simply confirms if a) is the case. But, for analytic truths b) simply confirm a) is true, though a) is already claiming to be true. Barrister means lawyer. Consequently analytic truths are true only because a) they mean what they do, which makes 2. false
Williamson's Chapter 3
Williamson claims that because philosophical questions are more conceptual in nature then questions in other disciplines an armchair methodology is necessary because it concerns truths that are less substantial and less world- involving.
1. Philosophical questions are more conceptual in nature then questions in other disciplines.
Because philosophical questions are not about the world but rather about concepts Williamson claims that at the central core of philosophy are conceptual truths. Because analytical truths are also not about words and are also less world- involving Williamson uses the words conceptual truths and analytical truths interchangeably.
2. Analytic truths are not about words or concepts even if words or concepts play a role in the truth.
3. So, philosophy has a central core of conceptual/ analytical truths
4. So, from (2) and (3) Philosophy is not in itself linguistic or conceptual
5. If philosophical truths are analytic then some have features of words or concepts without describing words or concepts.
Williamson wants to know weather the fact that philosophical truths are conceptual or analytic justifies the conceptual or linguistic turn.
Williamson claims that analytic sentences are true in virtue of their meaning, and analytic thoughts are true in virtue of their constituent concepts. Their truth is independent of the world, even the parts which consists of words and concepts. If this is the case then we needn’t get up from the arm chair to investigate them.
6. If every true sentence is true in virtue of both its meaning and how things are then analytic and synthetic truths are not true in radically different ways, this means that there is a component of analytic truths that relies on how things are in the world.
7. We cannot investigate synthetic truths from the armchair
8. If we take the linguistic or conceptual turn then philosophy itself is linguistic or conceptual.
9. From (4) and (8) we should not take the linguistic or conceptual turn.
I know I’m missing parts of his argument but I was trying to get the big picture, it seems as though if we take the definition of analytic to be the same as conceptual Williamson runs into problems but there is also the huge problem of defining analytic, at the end of it I’m not sure which result Williamson wants.
1. Philosophical questions are more conceptual in nature then questions in other disciplines.
Because philosophical questions are not about the world but rather about concepts Williamson claims that at the central core of philosophy are conceptual truths. Because analytical truths are also not about words and are also less world- involving Williamson uses the words conceptual truths and analytical truths interchangeably.
2. Analytic truths are not about words or concepts even if words or concepts play a role in the truth.
3. So, philosophy has a central core of conceptual/ analytical truths
4. So, from (2) and (3) Philosophy is not in itself linguistic or conceptual
5. If philosophical truths are analytic then some have features of words or concepts without describing words or concepts.
Williamson wants to know weather the fact that philosophical truths are conceptual or analytic justifies the conceptual or linguistic turn.
Williamson claims that analytic sentences are true in virtue of their meaning, and analytic thoughts are true in virtue of their constituent concepts. Their truth is independent of the world, even the parts which consists of words and concepts. If this is the case then we needn’t get up from the arm chair to investigate them.
6. If every true sentence is true in virtue of both its meaning and how things are then analytic and synthetic truths are not true in radically different ways, this means that there is a component of analytic truths that relies on how things are in the world.
7. We cannot investigate synthetic truths from the armchair
8. If we take the linguistic or conceptual turn then philosophy itself is linguistic or conceptual.
9. From (4) and (8) we should not take the linguistic or conceptual turn.
I know I’m missing parts of his argument but I was trying to get the big picture, it seems as though if we take the definition of analytic to be the same as conceptual Williamson runs into problems but there is also the huge problem of defining analytic, at the end of it I’m not sure which result Williamson wants.
Sunday, October 21, 2007
The perplexing case of the shifty 'child'.
A bit of a caveat before I begin... I was very undecided as to whether to post this or not. The reason for my indecision is based on the fact that blog posts can be seen by the world. And no one likes to show their weaknesses to the world. Where the weakness in this case is my complete perplexity. Either it is the case that I'm not getting the finer moves of the indexical response that the contextualists offer in cases of vagueness, or I am getting the finer moves and I just think they are bunk, or both. The perplexity is knowing which of the disjuncts is true. Definite weakness... so be kind...
I'm taking this example from the entry on Vagueness from the SEP, which can be used to illustrate the contextualists response of an “analogy between the sorites paradox and indexical sophistries”:
Base Step: A one day old human being is a child.
Induction Step: If an n day old human being is a child, then that human being is also a child when it is n+1 days old.
Conclusion: Therefore, a 36,500 day old human being is a child.
I'm taking this example from the entry on Vagueness from the SEP, which can be used to illustrate the contextualists response of an “analogy between the sorites paradox and indexical sophistries”:
Base Step: A one day old human being is a child.
Induction Step: If an n day old human being is a child, then that human being is also a child when it is n+1 days old.
Conclusion: Therefore, a 36,500 day old human being is a child.
- If the meaning of 'child' is uniform, then the context-invariant rule for using the term 'child' (its character) is constant.
- If the context-invariant rule for using the term 'child' (its character) is constant, then the linguistic meaning of a term (its character), which is a function from contexts to contents that delivers the term's content at each context, is consistent.
- So, if the meaning of 'child' is uniform, then the linguistic meaning of a term (its character), which is a function from contexts to contents that delivers the term's content at each context, is consistent.
- But, it is false that the meaning of 'child' is uniform.
- Therefore, it is not the case that the linguistic meaning of a term (its character), which is a function from contexts to contents that delivers the term's content at each context, is consistent.
The contextualist wishes to deny (4), that is to assert that the meaning of 'child' is uniform. So, given (3), the linguistic meaning of a term (its character), which is a function from contexts to contents that delivers the term's content at each context, is consistent.
But this makes no darn sense. If the meaning of 'child' is uniform (its character is consistent) then the contextualist would not only have to accept the induction step, but also the conclusion. Bad news bears!
So what to do? According to the Vagueness entry, it is: to treat the term 'child' like an indexical. That is to say that, because the set of things in which the term 'child', applies (its content) shifts with the context, it can still be claimed that the character remains the same but the content has changed because the context has shifted. “According to the contextualists, the rules governing the shifts prohibit us from interpreting any instance of the induction step as having a true antecedent and a false consequent. The very process of trying to refute the induction step changes the context so that the instance will not come out false.”
This response is really confusing to me (surprise of surprises!!). Is the claim here that in order not to interpret the induction step as having a true antecedent and a false consequent, we treat the term 'child' like and indexical, i.e. say that the content of the term 'child' shifts with the context from the antecedent to the consequent? Is that not what needs to happen in order to derive a false conclusion? If there is any shifting going on, that is any indexical treatment of the term 'child' it would need to be because you have to explain having an induction step that has a true antecedent and a false consequent, in order to derive a false conclusion.
Or is the claim here that there is a shift from the induction step to the conclusion? In which case the term 'child' has a shift in context and thereby content from the induction step to the conclusion. If so, then I am very, very confused because a conclusion can change in truth value, regardless of the truth conditions of the premises in which it is derived, by just simply having a content shift with a context. Perhaps, my confusion comes from a bias on my part (unsure at this point...), but is not the role of the conclusion to tell me something about the premises in which it is derived from? Where that something should be the content of what is at issue. But, if the content can shift from premises to conclusion based on a context, then the content in the premises is different than that in the conclusion. Why would you want that to happen?
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