This post is on the readings we got from the Philosophy of Mind artsy cut-and-paste handout with the thought experiment examples from Putnam and Burge. Both thought experiments run arguments that favour an account that takes our intentional states (beliefs, desires, etc.) to have wide content. That is that these intentional states are not wholly and correctly responsible for reflecting what our internal sates are (i.e. what's really going on inside our melons). Both arguments run something as follows:

1. If it is not the case that our intentional states supervene our internal states, then wide content is the correct account of mental goings on.
   
2. If our intentional states supervene our internal states, then our intentional states wholly and correctly reflect our internal states.
   
3. If our intentional states wholly and correctly reflect our internal states, then the meanings of words we use to express these states are correct.
   
4. It is not the case that the meanings of words we use to express these states are correct.
   
5. So, it is false that our intentional states wholly and correctly reflect our internal states.
   
6. Thus, it is not the case that our intentional states supervene our internal states.
   
7. Therefore, wide content is the correct account of mental goings on.
   

Premise (1) is definitional as far as wide content goes, so I'll leave it alone.

Premises (5), (6), and (7) are inferential from the other premises, so I'll leave them alone.

Premise (4) is justified through the lovely thought experiments created by Putnam and Burge that show instances where the words we use to express, that is the understanding of the meanings of our expressions, are incomplete or possibly (in the case of the Burge example) defective. But we use them anyhow, even when we know this may be the case. I'll leave this premise alone, because I think we do this. A lot.

Premise (2) and (3) are the tricky ones. (2) I'll agree with because if what it takes (that is the definition of supervene) for one state to supervene on another state is to wholly and correctly reflect that state, then no argument from me. Premise (3) is probably the premise that makes the biggest assumption and thus requires the most justification. An objection could be made that:

If we accept premise (4), then either it is not the case that the meanings of words we use to express these states are correct, or our intentional states wholly and correctly reflect our internal states.

I accept premise (4).

So, either it is not the case that the meanings of words we use to express these states are correct, or our intentional states wholly and correctly reflect our internal states.

This thus implies that, if the meanings of words we use to express these states are correct, then our intentional states wholly and correctly reflect our internal states.

This seems okay to me. When we use words, via expressions to express things, it is if the words are correct that we then say that they are expressing the right state. If we use the wrong words via expressions then we don't say that they express the right state, furthermore we don't say that when we get the words wrong, that is use the wrong expression, that it is the fault, or that there is some sort of incorrect reflection of what is going with the states inside our heads that make this happen. We are just getting the words wrong. This is undoubtedly not a great example, but ... say I express the sentence "I am the king of the world!". To claim that my misstep in expression, i.e. that I am using the wrong words like being a king when I darn well know that kings are male (n.b. and I am not) and that kings do not rule the whole world, means that my intentional sates are incorrectly reflecting my internal states, is bunk. Even if I was unaware of the correct definition of what a king is or what it feels like to be the one of the whole world, does not mean that I am incorrectly attributing my expression to some feeling of grandiose and regal superiority. In short, the entailment between expressions and intentional / internal states, used in favour of defending wide mental content vs. narrow content, I believe (ha!) is far too high of an infallibility standard to put expressions up to.