Epistemology of logical equivalences

Chris had an objection to Williamson brought up last class. It goes something like this:
Williamson argues:
1) Every metaphysically modal statement is logically equivalent to a counterfactual statement
2) For any two statements, if one is logically equivalent to another then when one is in an epistemic position to know the first, one is necessarily in an epistemic position to know the second
3) (1&2) -> 4
4) If we're in an epistemic position to know counter-factual claims, we're in an epistemic position to know metaphysically modal claims

Chris denies (2). After some thought, I think this is obviously right. For instance, consider a tautology too complex for the human mind to grasp. Then take ~(P&~P). The latter is equivalent to the former, yet we're in no epistemic position to know the former. Alternately, consider someone who's convinced by McGee's argument that modus ponens is invalid. Suppose further this person has (given his evidence) every reason to believe McGee and no reason not to. Arguably, this person could know P&(P -> Q), and have excellent independant evidence for ~Q. Not only would he be in no epistemic position to know Q, he'd be in a very good epistemic position to justifiably doubt Q.

Williamson is a smart guy, and it's hard to believe that he simply missed this. So let's see what he says:
"Given that quivalences (17) and (18) are logically true, metaphysically modal thinking is logically equivalent to a special case of counterfactual thinking, and the epistemology of the former is tantamount to a special case of the epistemology of the latter. Whoever has what it takes to understand the counterfactual conditional and the elementary logical auxiliaries ~ and (contradiction) has what it takes to understand the possibility and necessity operators"
He goes on to consider something like Chris's objection a bit later:
"Indeed, we have no sufficient reason to regard any of the equivalences as strict synonymies. That detracts little from their philosophical significance, for failure of strict synonymy does not imply failure of logical equivalence. The main philosophical concerns about possibility and necessity apply equally to anything logically equivalent to possibility or necessity. A non-modal analogy: ~A is logically equivalent to A->(contradiction), but presumably they are not stictly synonymous; nevertheless, once we have established that a creature can handle -> and (contradiction), we have established that it can handle something logically equivalent to negation, which answers the most interesting questions about its ability to handle negation"

I'm not sure exactly what to make of this, but it seems like Williamson is talking about a specific sort of logical equivalence. Not logical equivalence between statements, rather equivalence between logical operations. A new argument may be set up as follows:

1) If one is in a cognitive position to fluently use logical operator P, and applying P to a formula(s) is logically equivalent to applying Q to a formula(s), then one is in a cognitive position to fluently use logical operator Q.
2) [] is logically equivalent to C, where CA is defined as (~A []-> contradiction).
3) We're in a cognitive position to fluently use C
4) (1&2&3) -> (5)
5) We're in a cognitive position to fluently use []

I see this as no better off than the original argument. For instance, C' could be defined as (~A[]-> (negation of incredibly complex tautology)), and an analogous argument would say we're in a cognitive position to use C'. However, we're not in a cognitive position to use C'.
One could respond that we ARE in a cognitive position to use C', we're just not aware of the fact. This seems weak.
Furthermore, even if this revised argument is sound, it misses the point. We want to know how we know metaphysically modal truths, not how we've come into a position to use them (or something logically equivalent to them). If I want to know how you found out that all renates are alive, I won't be satisfied with the answer "I found out that all cordates are alive". More is needed.
I found this all quite vexing. any thoughts anyone?

Comments on Putman’s Thought Experiment: Earth and Twin-Earth

The thought experiment with water and twater tries to convince that our beliefs and desires are not just a matter of what is going on in our minds, if I am interpreting it correct. When I change the example it seems to be more clear, for instance a case between Mary and Suzy. When Mary talks or thinks about her mother, or what the concept of mother means, she refers to someone that gave birth to her and is biologically similar to her. Suzy was adopted, (this is something Mary is not aware of) and she uses the word mother to refer to her adoptive mother. So when Mary talks to Suzy about her adoptive mother she is actually referring to her biological mother. Mary and Suzy both use the same word; mother, but the way in which they use it has different extensions. Maybe this is not a good example because the word mother has many different extensions when someone different uses it, but we can think of it in another way, where there is the existence of a twin earth. On twin earth twin- Mary is exactly the same as earthian- Mary along with everything else except the fact that mothers on twin earth are not biologically similar to their children. If Mary was unknowingly switched in her sleep with twin Mary, she would be using the word mother to refer to someone different then she believes. I’m not exactly sure of why these examples show that the contents of beliefs supervene on our internal states. This seems like it is not a stretch to think that your surroundings and what goes on inside you indicate what beliefs you hold. The examples show then that beliefs that seem to be the same belief- type are actually not because they have different content. So, coming from identical people the beliefs are not the same, so there has to be something other than internally that reacts on belief, but can’t we just say that the fact that we think the beliefs are not the same shows that you and twin-you are not exactly the same and therefore it should be expected that you and twin-you’s beliefs wouldn’t be exactly the same? What about two different people placed in the exact same situations and surrounding acting and doing the exact same things and having the exact same internal goings on but in two parallel worlds or universes, should each and every one of their thoughts be the same? This example seems to me to also show that beliefs are caused by internal and external components. The examples just seem to give you what would already seem intuitive.

Habituals

Williamson wants to argue that (a) counterfactuals are intimately tied up with modality, (b)counterfactual thought plays a pivotal role in our everyday reasoning and consequently (c) a modal epistemology comes along with our everyday reasoning for free. To strengthen his argument he tries to show that we cannot make due without counterfactuals and that we cannot reduce them to anything that breaks their tie to modality. As a particular instance of the latter, Williamson argues that counterfactuals cannot be reduced to “habituals”. He attempts to drive a wedge between the two by producing a case in which a counterfactual has a different truth-value from a parallel habitual. The details of Williamson’s argument are as follows:
Consider the sentences:
(i) If Jones had taken arsenic, he would have shown just exactly those symptoms which he does in fact show.
(iH) If Jones takes arsenic, he [normally] shows just exactly those symptoms which he does in fact show.

(1) If a situation S can be produced in which (i) and (iH) differ in truth value, then (iH) cannot do the same work (i) does in all situations.

(2) Let S be the case in which Jones’ symptoms are not those he would normally show in arsenic poisoning but those he would show given that he had, unusually, been fasting for the previous 72 hours.

(3) S is a case in which (i) is true when (iH) is false, that is a case in which they differ in truth value.

(4) Thus, (iH) cannot do the same work (i) does in all situations.

Now I don’t know anything about habituals and a fortiori I lack knowledge about habitual semantics. However, I would imagine them to be something like: the habitual conditional A [h]->B is true iff in A circumstances, B normally comes about. This seems to line up with Williamson’s evaluation of (iH) as false. The problem I have is with TWs evaluation of (i) as true under S.
It seems to me that if Jones had taken arsenic he would *not* have shown just exactly those symptoms which he does in fact show under S, since the symptoms in S are *not* those he would normally show in arsenic poisoning but those he would show given that he had, unusually, been fasting for the previous 72 hours.
Even spelling this out in terms of possible world semantics seems to point to the falsity of (i). A non-insane principle is the following: worlds where “normal” situations occur are closer to the actual world than worlds in which “non-normal” situations occur. But given this principle and S, if we go to the closest world where Jones takes arsenic, it is not the case that he exhibits the symptoms he currently exhibits at @ (since the @-symptoms are not arsenic symptoms). Hence, (i) is false.
Williamson is super good at logic, so I’m pretty sure I’m the one in error but I do not currently see how his counterexample works.

Counterpossibles

One objection Williamson considers to his view is that not all counterpossibles are vacuously true. If this is right, then the principle NECESSITY is false:
(NECESSITY) [](A->B)->(A[]->B)
NECESSITY states that if it's necessary that A implies B, then if I were the case then B would be the case. One could hold that the principle fails when A is an impossibility. If A is an impossibility, then trivially in every possible world at which A holds, B also holds (there are no such worlds). However, even so it might still be intelligable (and correct) to say that were A to hold, B would not hold.
Williamson makes a case against this when considering a mathematician doing a reductio argument. His main strategy is to trade off truth for assertibility in such cases. Suppose you're trying to prove fermat's last theorum by using an impossible solution (S) to it to generate absurdity. You can use counter-factual reasoning to assert S []-> A, but can't assert S []->~S for the purposes of your proposed proof. He says this does not tell against the truth of S[]->~S. After all, a contradiction could be used to prove anything eventually, even if it will take more steps.
My concern is that strategies like this won't work for some logics. Suppose para-consistent logics are necessarily not correct. It still seems right to say that if they were correct then certain things would hold, and if they were correct certain other things wouldn't. After all, they're specifically designed to be able to handle such cases.

Thought Experiments

Something struck me as strange in the Kim rehash of Putnam and Burge’s thought experiments. In describing the earth-born astronaut Jones’ use of ‘water’ Kim says that “[i]f Jones stays on twin earth long enough, we will eventually interpret her word ‘water’ to mean twater [that is XYZ], not water, and attribute to her twater-thoughts rather than water thoughts, although of course it is difficult to say exactly when this change will come about.”

This brings to the fore all kinds of questions about how reference attaches to word meaning and use. As far as I remember, the historical-causal story of how reference fixing works is something like the following: the reference of any name ‘blah’ is fixed by an original user in a “baptism ceremony” which consist of the original user either ostensively or descriptively picking out the object blah and saying ‘blah’. The meaning (including reference) of ‘blah’ is then transmitted to new users of ‘blah’ when they intend to use ‘blah’ as the original user did. In this way, a long historical-causal chain of ‘blah’-use explains the transmission of the meaning along with the reference of the word.

So far so good.

Now let us turn our attention to poor tharthritis having Fred. Presumably, Fred intends to use ‘arthritis’ in the same way that his original community does. Yet, he also presumably knows that people outside of his community also use ‘arthritis’ (since otherwise he would not use ‘arthritis’ when complaining to the doctor); and no doubt also intends to use ‘arthritis’ in the way that the doctor does when he talks to the doctor. But now he intends to use ‘arthritis’ as both his community and the doctor do. On the historical-causal view it is unclear what the word ‘arthritis’ means. Is the extension of his use of ‘arthritis’, arthritis? Is it tharthritis? Is it both!?

One way to disambiguate would be to claim that the meaning of a word W in the mouth of a user X is always the meaning that W first had in X’s mouth unless X consciously corrects his meaning of the word. But if this holds, then it looks like Jones’ use of ‘water’ does not eventually come to mean ‘twater’ as Kim claims.

Another way to disambiguate would be to hold that the meaning of a word W in the mouth of a user X at time t is the meaning that X intends W to have at t (spelled out in an appropriate historical-causal way). But then it appears that Fred’s use of ‘arthritis’ might end up referring to both arthritis and thartritis. If this is true it would certainly be a startling discovery (at least for me). Most semantic theories that I know of only allow words in literal sentences to have single referents.

Of course there might be other ways to disambiguate the meaning of W. Perhaps the meaning of a word W in the mouth of a user X at time t is the meaning that the community C adorns W with. Where C is the community that X spends most of his time in. However, this account has the exact same problem as the second one whenever X has spent *equal* amounts of time in several communities. In any case, it has been interesting reviewing the thought experiments of Putman and Burge.

This post is on the readings we got from the Philosophy of Mind artsy cut-and-paste handout with the thought experiment examples from Putnam and Burge. Both thought experiments run arguments that favour an account that takes our intentional states (beliefs, desires, etc.) to have wide content. That is that these intentional states are not wholly and correctly responsible for reflecting what our internal sates are (i.e. what's really going on inside our melons). Both arguments run something as follows:

1. If it is not the case that our intentional states supervene our internal states, then wide content is the correct account of mental goings on.
   
2. If our intentional states supervene our internal states, then our intentional states wholly and correctly reflect our internal states.
   
3. If our intentional states wholly and correctly reflect our internal states, then the meanings of words we use to express these states are correct.
   
4. It is not the case that the meanings of words we use to express these states are correct.
   
5. So, it is false that our intentional states wholly and correctly reflect our internal states.
   
6. Thus, it is not the case that our intentional states supervene our internal states.
   
7. Therefore, wide content is the correct account of mental goings on.
   

Premise (1) is definitional as far as wide content goes, so I'll leave it alone.

Premises (5), (6), and (7) are inferential from the other premises, so I'll leave them alone.

Premise (4) is justified through the lovely thought experiments created by Putnam and Burge that show instances where the words we use to express, that is the understanding of the meanings of our expressions, are incomplete or possibly (in the case of the Burge example) defective. But we use them anyhow, even when we know this may be the case. I'll leave this premise alone, because I think we do this. A lot.

Premise (2) and (3) are the tricky ones. (2) I'll agree with because if what it takes (that is the definition of supervene) for one state to supervene on another state is to wholly and correctly reflect that state, then no argument from me. Premise (3) is probably the premise that makes the biggest assumption and thus requires the most justification. An objection could be made that:

If we accept premise (4), then either it is not the case that the meanings of words we use to express these states are correct, or our intentional states wholly and correctly reflect our internal states.

I accept premise (4).

So, either it is not the case that the meanings of words we use to express these states are correct, or our intentional states wholly and correctly reflect our internal states.

This thus implies that, if the meanings of words we use to express these states are correct, then our intentional states wholly and correctly reflect our internal states.

This seems okay to me. When we use words, via expressions to express things, it is if the words are correct that we then say that they are expressing the right state. If we use the wrong words via expressions then we don't say that they express the right state, furthermore we don't say that when we get the words wrong, that is use the wrong expression, that it is the fault, or that there is some sort of incorrect reflection of what is going with the states inside our heads that make this happen. We are just getting the words wrong. This is undoubtedly not a great example, but ... say I express the sentence "I am the king of the world!". To claim that my misstep in expression, i.e. that I am using the wrong words like being a king when I darn well know that kings are male (n.b. and I am not) and that kings do not rule the whole world, means that my intentional sates are incorrectly reflecting my internal states, is bunk. Even if I was unaware of the correct definition of what a king is or what it feels like to be the one of the whole world, does not mean that I am incorrectly attributing my expression to some feeling of grandiose and regal superiority. In short, the entailment between expressions and intentional / internal states, used in favour of defending wide mental content vs. narrow content, I believe (ha!) is far too high of an infallibility standard to put expressions up to.

Williamson’s argument for rejecting UAt and UDAt:

(1) Every vixen is a vixen.

UAt: Necessarily, whoever grasps the thought every vixen is a vixen assents to it.

UDAt: Necessarily, whoever grasps the thought every vixen is a vixen has a disposition to assent to it.

Williamson wants to know if we can maintain UAt or UDAt while acknowledging UA1 and UDA1 fails by the Stephen and Peter counterexample.

(2) Stephen assents to (1) if and only if he assents to the though every vixen is a vixen.

(3) He doesn’t assent to (1) so he doesn’t assent to the thought every vixen is a vixen.

(4) It follows that if t is the thought every vixen is a vixen then Stephen doesn’t assent to the thought every vixen is a vixen and is also a counterexample to UAt.

(5) If the thought that he associates with the sentence ‘Every vixen is a vixen’ is not the thought every vixen is a vixen then he is not a counterexample

(6) Using the word ‘thought’ indicates that inferential differences between Peter and Stephen and us represent differences between the thoughts we associate with (1). Peter and Stephen associate different thoughts then our own when assenting to (1).

(7) If (6), then we should translate their idiolects non-homophonically into ours.

(8) A translation scheme would invoke refusal to acknowledge the full challenge which Peter and Stephen have issued to (1).

(9) To claim (6) then the disagreement between Peter and Stephen and us sounds less threatening because it bundles together logical and semantic differences without unification.

(10) So, the links from understanding to assent and dispositions to assent fail for thought like they do for language.

For reasons other than (8) I think (6) fails because it separates thought from language. If this should be the case then the thought someone associates with a sentence isn’t just the thought of that sentence. This seems kind of strange to accept. I think Williamsons argument for failing UAt and UDAt is a good one.

In chapter 4 Williamson argues against the understanding-truth link. He argues that for the understanding-truth link to hold it would have to be the case that Black and Rutherford either did not understand their own theory or that the theory is true. Since it has been proven that the phlogiston theory is false, it would seem that the only way to save the understanding-truth link we would have to say that Black and Rutherford did not understand their own theory. Clearly it is false that Black and Rutherford did not understand their own theory. The argument goes as follows:
1. If the understanding-truth links hold for phlogiston sentences, then either
Black and Rutherford did not understand their own theory or the theory
is true.
2. ~ (Black and Rutherford did not understand phlogiston theory & phlogiston
theory is true.)
3. ~ Understanding-truth links hold for phlogiston theory.
However, one may argue that premise 2. is false. One may argue that one of the disjuncts are true, namely, phlogiston is true. This disjunct maybe true if we replace the core of phlogiston theory with the conditional ‘If phlogiston exists then the core of phlogiston theory is true. Williamson dismisses this argument stating “Arguably, however, since ‘phlogiston’ fails to refer, that conditional too fails to express a proposition, so even this more cautions sentence is not true, although it is also not false.” (P. 11 chap 4)
I believe there are two things wrong with this. First, he states “Arguably, however, since ‘phlogiston’ fails to refer” that the conditional fails to have a truth value. This statement is arguable. There are theories that hold that abstract objects have truth values.
Second, even if we concede that it does not have a truth value just because this conditional fails to have a truth value does not mean that the conditional is false, which is what Williamson needs to make his claim that understanding-truth links do not hold. Since Williamson is the one who wants to argue that nothing is epistemically available simply on the basis of linguistic and conceptual competence then the onus of proof is on him if he wishes to accomplish this.

Sorry this is late,
Analytic truths are less substantial then synthetic truths because they impose no constraint on the world.
They do impose a constraint on the world; the recipe for truth is that truth depends on (a) what is expressed and (b) whether things actually are that way.
1. All vixens are female foxes.
1 is true because vixens are female foxes but does this impose a constraint on the world? It should be the case that in the world all vixens are female foxes. But what if all foxes were extinct? It should still be the case that if they did exist in the world then all vixens would be female foxes.
So analytic truths are not less substantial then synthetic truths rather there is little difference betweent them.
Understanding words in a language is just the ability to use them to interact well with other members of the community, in social practice.
Frege- analyticity: Frege- analytic sentences are logical truths or truths that can be turned into logical truths by replacing synonyms for synonyms.
2. All vixens are vixens
is a logical truth.
Vixen and female fox are synonymous so it follows that
1. All vixens are female foxes
is also a logical truth.
The problem that arises is when someone is not correct in their understanding of a word. There can be a case where a person makes a mistake in the definition of a word. So it could be the case that someone misunderstands that vixens are also immature male foxes and so believes 2 without believing in 1.
There is also a problem when words are not used in ways where synonyms can be replaced, like bachelor of arts degree. But a solution is that we take bachelor of arts degree as one whole word or concept instead of breaking it down further.

Sorry this is a bit of a back-up from Chapter 4's recent posts, to section 8. where TW is talking about what exactly is a shared language, and how exactly they (or it) is possible.

1. If there is something that binds together the common practice of using a word with a given meaning, then there is a shared understanding of that word.
   
2. If there is a shared understanding of that word, then there is either a mutual similarity of the constituents or it is the complex interrelations of the constituents.
   
3. So, if there is something that binds together the common practice of using a word with a given meaning, then the something is either a mutual similarity of the constituents or the something is the complex interrelations of the constituents.
   
4. It is not the case that the something is a mutual similarity of the constituents.
   
5. Thus, if there is something that binds together the common practice of using a word with a given meaning, then the something is the complex interrelations of the constituents.
   
6. There is something that binds together the common practice of using a word with a given meaning.
   
7. Therefore, the something is the complex interrelations of the constituents.
   

TW proposes that the something which is the complex interrelations of the constituents, is above all the constituent's causal interrelations. And that “the idea that a shared understanding of a word requires a shared stock of platitudes depends on the assumption that uses of a word by different agents or at different times can be bound together into a common practice of using that word with a given meaning only by an invariant core of beliefs.” So, the something is an invariant core of beliefs (foreshadow moment, I think... not JBs, not JTBs, no esatblishing the entailment links between UA, UK, UJ or UT. Just plain old beliefs / knowledge. Like I said not sure).

The premises that stick out here are 1., 2., 4., and 6.

How about 1. and 6.? Though perhaps wishful and hopeful, the truth of premises 1. and 6. are hard to resist. If there isn't some sort of something that binds the my use and meaning of words (or terms) with those of my fellow man. Well frankly I'm sunk, and so is everyone else. To deny either of these two would invite skepticism about a binding theory of meaning and usage. Bad.

How about 4.? The conditions placed on having a mutual similarity of the constituents, is that they have “some invariant feature, shared by all the constituents and somehow prior to the complex as a whole.” To be fair TW qualifies these conditions by stating that this feature almost never occurs. So, even if a strict cataloging were to take place and this feature was found to occur amongst constituents some of the time, this would still not yield the widespread commonalities within usage and meaning that seem so apparent.

How about 2.? The antecedent seems to be fine for the reasons given above for 1. and 6. But the consequent is a little odd, if not false. A disjunction does not seem à propos in this instance (in all fairness perhaps it is my reconstruction of what is going on, but this does seem to be the way TW is setting things up). Rather, having a mutual similarity of constituents is a feature of the complex interrelations of those constituents.

KUt' - Round II

As I understand it, the objective of chapters 3 and 4 is to test out the idea that the methodology of philosophy consists in something like searching for analytic truths and that the linguistic/conceptual-turners can take refuge in this fact on the grounds that analytic truths are linguistic or conceptual in some sense.
I was with Williamson in chapter 4 right up until the end where he argues against KUt’ (i.e. whoever knows …insert epistemic-analytic true thought here… in the normal way does so on the basis of their grasp of the thought).
Here is my formulation of Williamson’s argument:
(1) Either ‘their grasp of the thought’ in KUt’ can be taken in a thick way or in a thin way.
(2) If we take ‘grasping’ in the thick way (i.e. on the basis of the facts underlying the grasping), then grasping depends on knowledge that is not conceptual.
(3) If KUt’ is taken in a way that doesn’t depend on conceptual knowledge, then it will not help the conceptual-turner any.
(4) If we take ‘grasping’ in the thin way (i.e. on the mere fact that the thought in question has been grasped), then there is no way in which grasping is a basis for knowing in any useful sense.
(5) If KUt’ is taken in a way that makes it epistemologically useless, then it will not help the conceptual-turner any.
(6) If (1)-(5), then (7).
(7) KUt’ will not help the conceptual-turner any.
Ignoring the sloppy grammar in my formulation of Williamson’s argument, I think that (4) is false. There is still an important way in which ‘grasping’ in the thin sense is a useful basis for knowing. Namely, such grasping is a useful basis for knowing in cases where the truths are so thin, fundamental and basic that there can be no other way to explain our knowledge of them. These cases include truths of logic and truths about truth. To be sure, these are truths about the way the world is. But I’m sure Williamson would agree that we do not come to know about them by coming to know about the world – we come to know them merely by having grasped them.
Despite this point, I think that to restrict the role of philosophy only to the study of these “thin” truths is to place too strong a constraint on philosophy, so the conceptual-turner is not saved by resorting to this line of reasoning.

KUt' whoever knows every vixen is a vixen in the normal way does so simply on the basis of their grasp of the thought

Williamson says that there are two ways to take this, a thin way and a thick way. According to the thin way the mere fact that the person grasps the thought provides an epistemic justification. According to the thick way it's the facts that constitute the grasp of the thought that provides the epistemic lift.
Williamson's argument against the thick way there's alot more to understanding the thought involved than just semantic or linguistic considerations. Many of these are in nature not conceptual or linguistic, such as the factors that add to your competence with an expression (rather than knowledge of its meaning). If the conceptual turner wants something to go on here, she needs epistemic justification that comes from merely linguistic or conceptual material.
The thought I had was that if these are genuinly the considerations necessary for grasping a thought, then they are conceptual considerations. The conceptual turner isn't dead in the water, it's just that the conceptual material she thought she was working with turned out to be a little different.
On the other hand, if all these considerations (previously thought not to be about thought or language) turn out to be conceptual, then any use for the distinction the conceptual turner needs is dissolved. Analytic thoughts or sentences don't really have any special epistemic status in virtue of being conceptual.

Paper Review Guidelines

Here are some guidelines to help you give good feedback:

- The introduction should be clear and to the point. It should make clear what the thesis of the paper is and it should say what the paper is going to do.

- Typically, the first section after the introduction will be an explanation of the view in the target paper. The explanation of the view should be clear; if there's something about the view your peer is focusing on that does not make sense to you, say so! The explanation of the target view should make sense to someone at your level in philosophy who has not read the target paper and is not in our class. So, for instance, you don't need to explain what 'valid' means but you should take time to explain key technical terms or ideas that are not common currency in philosophy.

- The paper should contain an argument that your peer has extracted from the target paper. It should be the main argument your peer is focusing on. It should be presented in numbered premise-conclusion form and it should be valid. It should not just come out of nowhere. A good way to set up an extracted argument is to informally explain the "gist" of the argument in the target paper and say "we can set out/present/state the argument more clearly as follows:

1. Premise
2. Premise
3. Conclusion"

It should be completely clear why there is a numbered list in your paper and what that numbered list is supposed to be.

- The paper should explain and defend the premises in the extracted argument. Spend time saying a bit in favour of the premises of the argument and make sure to define any technical terms. What you're trying to do here is to get the reader to see what can be said on behalf of the premises in the argument you'll criticize. As always, be explicit about what you're doing. Don't just launch into reasons for accepting the premises; tell the reader what you're doing and be explicit about which premises you're discussing.

- The paper should present an objection in numbered premise-conclusion form. The objection must be valid and it must deny a premise in the first argument. The argument should not just be "dropped into" the paper. Introduce your argument. You can follow the strategy of informally explaining your idea and presenting it more formally as a valid objection.

- The objection should be explained/defended. Same as for the original argument.

- The paper should consider a reply to the objection. Which premise in the objection might the author of the target paper reject and why? Be specific about which premise in the objection is being called into question. (Hint: This is easier to do if you don't use the same numbers for the premises in your extracted argument and your objection. So don't start both with '1', for instance.)

- The paper should contain an overall evaluation. Is the objection sound? Why or why not?

Throughout, assume that the reader is lazy, mean, and stupid. Lazy: The reader does not want to have to think. You do the thinking and spell it all out in your paper. Don't make the reader have to work. Mean: If what you write can be taken in more than one way, assume that the reader will take it in the least charitable way. Correct for this by avoiding any looseness and disambiguating important ambiguities. Stupid: Your reader will not "get" what you are saying. Spell it out in detail.

Remember, your job as peer reviewer is to help your peer improve her/his paper. So don't be shy about saying that you didn't understand something, that there's a gap in the reasoning, that a better defence can be provided for a particular premise, etc. As always you should be polite and respectful, but you're not doing your peer any favors if you just say everything is fine as is. As with the previous reviews, you're strongly encouraged to talk to each other about the paper. After all, that's the fun part: discussing an interesting philosophical issue with someone smart. So have fun with it and make sure to give your peer as much help as you can.

Justin D's Chapter 4 Post:

In chapter four, Williamson argues against those who try hold onto philosophical exceptionalism by defending epistemic analyticity. One of these arguments in particular is focused on rejecting the construal of epistemic analyticity in terms of (UAl’LRule): necessarily, whoever understands the meaning of the logical particles contained in a logical rule assents to that rule. This is supposed to be a case where (the UAl’ version of) epistemic analyticity is on its firmest footing. If Williamson can successfully argue against cases like these, it’s back to the drawing board for defenders of epistemic analyticity. He argues as follows:

1. If there is someone who understands the meaning of the logical particles that occur within a rule but dissents from that rule, then there is a counterexample to (UAl’LRule).
2. If there is a counterexample to (UAl’LRule), then (UAl’LRule) fails.
3. McGee is someone who understands the meaning of logical particles that occur within modus ponens (MP) but dissents from MP.
4. If (3), then there is a counterexample to (UAl’LRule).
5. If (3) and (4), then (6) (UAl’LRule) fails.
6. (UAl’LRule) fails.

I would now like to canvass opinions on the following Weathersonian counterargument to Williamson:

7. “[T]he meaning of a denoting term is the most natural object, property or relation that satisfies most of our usage dispositions” (Weatherson, 2003: 23).
8. If (7), then one can be a competent language user and also be wrong about the meaning of a denoting term, in the case where one's dispositions to use the term fail to coincide with the most natural object, property or relation in the vicinity of said disposition.
9. If (7) and (8), then (10).
10. If X’s disposition to use a term t fails to coincide with the most natural object, property or relation in the vicinity of t, then X is wrong about the meaning of t but can still be a competent language user.
11. McGee’s disposition to use ‘if’ fails to coincide with the most natural object, property or relation in the vicinity of ‘if. (Since, the most natural meaning of ‘if’ is the classical meaning of ‘if’).
12. If (10) and (11), then (13).
13. McGee could still be a competent language user but McGee is wrong about the meaning of ‘if’.
14. If McGee and those with parallel intuitions are wrong about the meaning of ‘if’, then it would be unsurprising that they deny MP and their denial of MP would not count as a counterexample to (UAl’LRule).
15. If (13) and (14), then (16) the McGee counterexample to (UAl’LRule) fails.
16. The McGee counterexample to (UAl’LRule) fails.

Moreover, if a strategy of this sort works in this case, then it will also work against some of Williamson’s other arguments against an epistemological conception of analyticity.
Does anyone buy this argument? Why or why not?
In my opinion Weatherson’s theory of meaning puts too much weight on naturalness, especially given that he takes naturalness to be basic/irreducible. Does his theory of meaning license too much? Can we get clear enough on what it is for something to be more natural than something else in order make use of his theory?

Williamson Chapter 4

Understanding-assent link: our sheer linguistic and conceptual competence mandates assent to some sentences or thoughts and inferences

A logical truth is (1) Every Vixen is a Vixen
Sentence (1) can be written as a understanding-assent link as UA1.

UA1: Necessarily, whoever understands the sentence ‘Every vixen is a vixen’ assents to it.

Is UA1 true? If UA1 is true then an armchair methodology of philosophy is based on understanding-assent links.

Williamson’s counterexample is a situation in which a person, A, given sentence (1) infers that (1) entails
(2) There is at least one Vixen
Person A does this through seemingly logical thought, with very good reasons for his belief’s etc.
In this case person A, for background reasons which can be endlessly thought up, denies (2), and so it follows that he also denies (1).
Because A doesn’t assent to (1), under the claim UA1, person A doesn’t understand (1). This seems wrong because a in the situation described person A seems to understand (1) but by some belief of a mistaken theory, or because of certain background belief bred into person A, he doesn’t accept (2).
Williamson claims then that UA1 is false and because of this example nothing is epistemically available only on the bases of linguistic and conceptual competence.

I don’t think this counterexample is very good because it seems as though UA1 has not been proven false because it shouldn’t matter what a person’s view on the matter is when some of their other views are clearly mistaken, no matter how smart or intellectual you imagine them to be. It seems unrealistic that someone denies a logical truth.
Maybe this is too harsh a reading of Williamson, I just didn’t think his example was very convincing.

I think I get what Williamson's overall picture is behind chapter 3.
Williamson argues against Quine, who would deny the synthetic analytic distinction altogether. What I gather from chapter 3 is that Williamson wants to claim the disjunction of (1) and (2).
1) not all philosophical truths are analytic
2) analytic truths are no less substantial (informative about the world) than synthetic ones
If either (1) or (2) is right than philosophical discoveries are no less substantial than any other discovery. So I take this chapter to be a revolt against philosophical exceptionalism about subject matter.
Seperately, he seems to endorse the disjunction of (1) and (3).
3) analytic truths are not known in any special way in virtue of being analytic
If either (1) or (3) is right then the way we investigate philosophical truths is not necessarily different from the way we investigate any other truths. So I take this point to be a revolt against philosophical exceptionalism about method.
He goes on to argue this (though in what appears to be a sort of jumbled way) about modal analyticity, frege-analyticity and direct reference-analyticity. But generally, as pointed out in the chapter, Kripke has a good defense:
A) ~ (analyticity -> necessity)
B) if (A) then (C)
C) (2)
and
D) ~(analyticity -> a-prioricity)
E) if (D) then (F)
F) (3)

One could deny (B) and (E), but that seems odd. It seems like one motivation for claiming analyticity has a special metaphysical status (of not informative about the world) is because of its correlation with necessity, ditto for its epistemological status and a-prioricity.

In the third chapter Williamson argues that it is false that analytic truths differ from synthetic ones by being true ‘in virtue of meaning’. For Williamson the intended contrast is that synthetic truths are true because a) they mean what they do and b) things are as the meaning requires. However, analytic truths need only to satisfy a) to be true. Williamson believes analytic truths need to also satisfy a) and b) to be true. Williamson believes that if analytic truths are true by only satisfying a) then it is only because we take b) for granted. Williamson claims that “[i]t is no good to say “Never mind whether barristers are lawyers; ‘Barristers are lawyers’ is true simply because it means that barristers are lawyers”.”
1. If analytic truths are true only because a) they mean what they do then ‘barristers are lawyers’ is true simply because it means that barristers are lawyers.
2. ~ Barristers are lawyers’ is true simply because it means that barristers are lawyers.
3. :. ~ Analytic truths are true only because a) they mean what they do.I believe premise 2. is false. The reasons given in support for 2. are that Williamson claims that we take b) for granted and says it is no good to do that. However, b) is not doing anything in the case of analytic truths. For synthetic truths such as ‘Barbara is a barrister’ a) supplies the meaning and b) confirms if the meaning is the case. b) does not confirm if the supplied meaning is the meaning of ‘Barbara is a barrister’. However, for a synthetic truth such as ‘Barristers are lawyers’ a) supplies the meaning again and b) confirms if the meaning is the meaning. Thus ‘Barristers are lawyers’ is true because a) ‘Barristers are lawyers’ means that barristers are a kind of lawyer who are people who have a law degree and passed the bar exam, are lawyers, who are people who have a law degree and passed the bar exam and b) confirms if it is the case that ‘Barristers are lawyers’ means that barristers are a kind of lawyer who are people who have a law degree and passed the bar exam, are lawyers, who are people who have a law degree and passed the bar exam. For synthetic truth b) need not confirm if the meaning (a)) is true, it simply confirms if a) is the case. But, for analytic truths b) simply confirm a) is true, though a) is already claiming to be true. Barrister means lawyer. Consequently analytic truths are true only because a) they mean what they do, which makes 2. false

Williamson's Chapter 3

Williamson claims that because philosophical questions are more conceptual in nature then questions in other disciplines an armchair methodology is necessary because it concerns truths that are less substantial and less world- involving.

1. Philosophical questions are more conceptual in nature then questions in other disciplines.

Because philosophical questions are not about the world but rather about concepts Williamson claims that at the central core of philosophy are conceptual truths. Because analytical truths are also not about words and are also less world- involving Williamson uses the words conceptual truths and analytical truths interchangeably.

2. Analytic truths are not about words or concepts even if words or concepts play a role in the truth.

3. So, philosophy has a central core of conceptual/ analytical truths

4. So, from (2) and (3) Philosophy is not in itself linguistic or conceptual

5. If philosophical truths are analytic then some have features of words or concepts without describing words or concepts.

Williamson wants to know weather the fact that philosophical truths are conceptual or analytic justifies the conceptual or linguistic turn.

Williamson claims that analytic sentences are true in virtue of their meaning, and analytic thoughts are true in virtue of their constituent concepts. Their truth is independent of the world, even the parts which consists of words and concepts. If this is the case then we needn’t get up from the arm chair to investigate them.

6. If every true sentence is true in virtue of both its meaning and how things are then analytic and synthetic truths are not true in radically different ways, this means that there is a component of analytic truths that relies on how things are in the world.

7. We cannot investigate synthetic truths from the armchair

8. If we take the linguistic or conceptual turn then philosophy itself is linguistic or conceptual.

9. From (4) and (8) we should not take the linguistic or conceptual turn.

I know I’m missing parts of his argument but I was trying to get the big picture, it seems as though if we take the definition of analytic to be the same as conceptual Williamson runs into problems but there is also the huge problem of defining analytic, at the end of it I’m not sure which result Williamson wants.

Natalie

The perplexing case of the shifty 'child'.

A bit of a caveat before I begin... I was very undecided as to whether to post this or not. The reason for my indecision is based on the fact that blog posts can be seen by the world. And no one likes to show their weaknesses to the world. Where the weakness in this case is my complete perplexity. Either it is the case that I'm not getting the finer moves of the indexical response that the contextualists offer in cases of vagueness, or I am getting the finer moves and I just think they are bunk, or both. The perplexity is knowing which of the disjuncts is true. Definite weakness... so be kind...

I'm taking this example from the entry on Vagueness from the SEP, which can be used to illustrate the contextualists response of an “analogy between the sorites paradox and indexical sophistries”:

Base Step: A one day old human being is a child.

Induction Step: If an n day old human being is a child, then that human being is also a child when it is n+1 days old.

Conclusion: Therefore, a 36,500 day old human being is a child.

1. If the meaning of 'child' is uniform, then the context-invariant rule for using the term 'child' (its character) is constant.
2. If the context-invariant rule for using the term 'child' (its character) is constant, then the linguistic meaning of a term (its character), which is a function from contexts to contents that delivers the term's content at each context, is consistent.
3. So, if the meaning of 'child' is uniform, then the linguistic meaning of a term (its character), which is a function from contexts to contents that delivers the term's content at each context, is consistent.
4. But, it is false that the meaning of 'child' is uniform.
5. Therefore, it is not the case that the linguistic meaning of a term (its character), which is a function from contexts to contents that delivers the term's content at each context, is consistent.

The contextualist wishes to deny (4), that is to assert that the meaning of 'child' is uniform. So, given (3), the linguistic meaning of a term (its character), which is a function from contexts to contents that delivers the term's content at each context, is consistent.

But this makes no darn sense. If the meaning of 'child' is uniform (its character is consistent) then the contextualist would not only have to accept the induction step, but also the conclusion. Bad news bears!

So what to do? According to the Vagueness entry, it is: to treat the term 'child' like an indexical. That is to say that, because the set of things in which the term 'child', applies (its content) shifts with the context, it can still be claimed that the character remains the same but the content has changed because the context has shifted. “According to the contextualists, the rules governing the shifts prohibit us from interpreting any instance of the induction step as having a true antecedent and a false consequent. The very process of trying to refute the induction step changes the context so that the instance will not come out false.”

This response is really confusing to me (surprise of surprises!!). Is the claim here that in order not to interpret the induction step as having a true antecedent and a false consequent, we treat the term 'child' like and indexical, i.e. say that the content of the term 'child' shifts with the context from the antecedent to the consequent? Is that not what needs to happen in order to derive a false conclusion? If there is any shifting going on, that is any indexical treatment of the term 'child' it would need to be because you have to explain having an induction step that has a true antecedent and a false consequent, in order to derive a false conclusion.

Or is the claim here that there is a shift from the induction step to the conclusion? In which case the term 'child' has a shift in context and thereby content from the induction step to the conclusion. If so, then I am very, very confused because a conclusion can change in truth value, regardless of the truth conditions of the premises in which it is derived, by just simply having a content shift with a context. Perhaps, my confusion comes from a bias on my part (unsure at this point...), but is not the role of the conclusion to tell me something about the premises in which it is derived from? Where that something should be the content of what is at issue. But, if the content can shift from premises to conclusion based on a context, then the content in the premises is different than that in the conclusion. Why would you want that to happen?

Aboutness, Questions and the Original Question.

What we need to have to settle the debate at hand is an analysis of ‘For any given question Q, Q is about X’. One way to start is by examining the components of such an analysis. This entails looking at what questions are, that is what kind of structure/entity they are, and what questions are about, that is what counts as answers to them.
One prominent analysis of questions and answers is given in Belnap and Steel’s The Logic of Questions and Answers. They hold that (for a certain class of questions) the answer to a question depends on what the asker had in mind for an answer. For example, if someone were to ask ‘Why did Ben steal the car?’, it seems that many different but equally acceptable answers could be given depending on the intent of the asker. If the asker was sociologically minded, an acceptable answer might be ‘Ben stole the car because he belongs to the lower-middleclass, is a Catholic and lower-middleclass Catholics are prone to thievery.’ If the asker was street-thugidly minded, an acceptable answer might be ‘Ben stole the car because he was the only person in his gang that could hotwire cars.’ The point here is that the answer to a question and question-aboutness are relative to the reference classes that the enquirer considers relevant.
Now let us apply this sketch of an analysis to the original question (OQ): ‘Was mars always either dry or not dry?’.
1) Presumably, (OQ) is a question like the above and hence depends on the reference classes the asker has in mind.
2) If (OQ) is a question that depends on the reference classes the asker has in mind, then it is easy to see how the question may be about any subclass of a set like {vagueness, matter, the laws of logic, space travel, H2O, language, concepts …}.
3) If (1) and (2), then (4).
4) The majority of questions, including (OQ), could be philosophical ones while also being about things other than language or concepts.
5) If (4) then philosophers are not significantly restricted in the kinds of questions they can pose.
-So far so good for Williamson. On this analysis of questions and answers, philosophical questions needn’t be solely linguistic or conceptual and our methodology has not been restricted at this level. However,…
6) If (1), (2) and (3) [i.e. the inference to (4)] holds, then analogously the questions of chemistry and other non-armchair questions are philosophical questions.
7) It is false that the questions of chemistry and other non-armchair questions are philosophical questions.
8) If (6) and (7), then [either ~(1) or ~(2) or ~(3)].
9) Either, ~(1) or ~(2) or ~(3).
On the analysis of questions given above, it seems like the right move here is to deny (3). Though it is true that questions like (OQ) can be philosophical, they seem to be so only in virtue of the asker fixing the meaning of the question with respect to linguistic or conceptual reference class elements.
I think this argument illustrates a fatal flaw in Williamson’s argument in chapter 2. He presumes that showing (OQ) to be both philosophical and not necessarily about language, is sufficient to show that philosophy is not solely interested in matters of language or concept analysis. However, now that we have seen something about the structure of questions, it is a very live possibility that (OQ) is philosophical in virtue of being asked with a subset of the reference classes {vagueness, the laws of logic, concepts, semantics …} in mind. Alternately, (OQ) is not about language or concepts only in virtue of being asked with respect to a subset of the reference class {matter, space travel, H2O, …}. But now these two ways of asking (OQ) appear disjoint, the latter is no longer a philosophical question. In brief, it is a very live possibility that (OQ) is philosophical only insofar as it is asked with a reference class containing LINGUISTIC or CONCEPTUAL elements. After an in-depth analysis of questions, answers and aboutness, Williamson’s argument is unconvincing.

Objection from non-sucky implicit aboutness standards

Williamson poses an argument to the effect that
(M) Mars was always either dry or not dry
is implicitly about language:

1) (M) is equivalent (truth functionally) to (ML) The sentence "Mars was always either dry or not dry" is true, which is explicitly about language
2) (1) -> (3)
3) (M) is implicitly about language

This argument is bad because truth functional equivalence is much too weak to be a standard for implicit aboutness. A similar argument could be run to the effect that (ML) is implicitly about Mars, or any other truth functionaly equivalent sentence for that matter. So, here's a better argument:

(IA) If a sentence S is truth-functionally equivalent to a sentence about language S', AND the initial justification for S includes the truth of S' then S is implicitly about language
4) (M) meets the conditions for (IA)
5) (M) is implicitly about language

As it turns out, I believe this second argument is also inadequate. In practice, when Williamson presents ways of answering (M), he never explicitly answers (ML). An additional argument would be needed to show that (ML) was implicitly answered and used as a hidden premise in the arguments that answer (M). I'm unconvinced that this is true, and even if it were true I'm not sure it could be shown to be true.

This one is probably a bit obvious at this point but since I am the first to post, here it is.
In the second chapter Williamson does a case study which asks the question “Was Mars always either dry or not dry? He argues that this question is philosophical in nature and not about language or thought, but must be resolved with inquiry into thought and language. This conclusion supports the book’s overall arguments, namely that topical philosophical exceptionalism and methodological philosophical exceptionalism are false. It supports these conclusions because it shows that (at least in some instances) some of the traditional views on the subject matter of philosophy are false, namely the conceptual/linguistic turn. Also that the ways in which philosophical questions are answered are not fundamentally different from the ways other non philosophical questions are answered.

A. The original question is philosophical in nature.
B. The original is not about language or thought.
C. The original must be resolved with inquiry into thought and language.
1. (A & B & C) -> The original question supports the conclusion that topical philosophical exceptionalism and methodological philosophical exceptionalism are false.
2. :. The original question supports the conclusion that topical philosophical exceptionalism and methodological philosophical exceptionalism are false.
I will now argue against A. William claims that “[t]he original question is at least proto-philosophical in character.” He also claims that the sentence “Was Mars always either uninhabited or not dry?” is not philosophical in nature. The only support Williamson provides that the original question is a philosophical in nature is that “when we discuss its answer, we find ourselves invoking recognizable philosophical considerations.” However, by this logic the sentence “Was Mars always either uninhabited or not dry?” would be considered philosophical in nature if it invokes recognizable philosophical considerations.” Williamson himself admits that this question invokes recognizable philosophical considerations in the following passage: “Although philosophical issues can be raised about the words in both questions, it does not follow that merely in using those words one is in any way engaging in philosophy.” Williamson seems to be contradicting himself.
Thanks to Justin and Chris for addressing this in class. Comments?

Comment Paper for 10/15 and Final Paper Draft

We have a week off due to the Thanksgiving break. I am only assigning one comment paper for that period since you have a paper draft to work on. For your comment paper, please email me a summary of Williamson's main points in Chapter 2 and comment on how successful you think his overall arguments for those points have been so far. Several of the comment papers have focused on good things to think about, but they are decidedly "tree"-oriented rather than "forest"-oriented. So I want you to think about how Williamson uses the particular issues he discusses in detail in support of his larger points and how well he's supported those points. This is to help you think about the "forest"--what his goals are and why he's talking about what he's talking about. Please email your comment to me by the usual time on Sunday, Oct. 14. Do not post this one to the blog.

As for the final paper draft: You will receive detailed instructions for the outline once you discuss your topic with me and not a moment before. This is intended to ensure that you will discuss your topic with me. So send me an email regarding your thoughts on particular topics.

In contrast to the below post, I do not think that the vagueness of an object or a predicate is a result of some vagueness about the real world.

For example, we can consider "Mars" as being a non-vague entity, as "Mars" clearly refers to a finite entity. However, things like "Mount Everest," etc. are considered "vague" entities, as there is no definitive Mount Everest (as TW mentions in the first paragraph).

In this sense, the problem seems to be with language, as we use the term "Object" or "Extension," or "Predicate" to apply to two distinctly different categories of things, both vague and non-vague, when they have distinctly different properties and differing ontologies. We just tend to apply vague predicates and treat their truth values the same way we would non-vague predicates, even though they are very different things and it is not clear we should do so.

To illustrate, we can consider a vague predicate versus a non-vague predicate. Let's consider the two predicates, "is dry," and, "has 5 water molecules." Both descriptors refer to the exact same planet at the same time, though one is vague and the other not. The state of affairs of the world is not vague, as it can be described by the latter definite description, and follows all of the usual, "Either Mars has 5 water molecules or it does not have 5 water molecules" and the like. It is only when we take the vague predicate, "is dry" and try to apply it to the world as we would a definite description, that things start to become complicated.

So (I think) what I am saying is that in the case of the predicate "is dry" The only reason the sentence, "Mars is always dry or not dry," is difficult to ascribe a truth value to is not because the world is vague, just that it is our general tendency to apply descriptors and concieve of things in ways that are useful for practical reasons (just as the term "Mount Everest" serves practical purposes) rather than encoded with definitive meanings. It's not the world that is the problem -- the world is as it is, with finite properties -- but rather it is our way of thinking/talking about the world that runs us into the difficulties that we encounter with the "Original Question." Or that's probably what TW was saying, I'm not sure anymore.

I think I'm on board with this "thought and talk" method of "serious" philosophy, but only because of footnote #14, and the sentence that preceeds it. Mainly because I don't want to admit to having a short attention span.

jw.

This is the argument which I will be looking at, which is found at the beginning of chapter two, and is then reiterated later on page 22/23. I will present a counter argument, which I think Williamson rejects to hastily, and discuss why I think the objection works.

Williamson’s argument:
1) If vagueness derives from our thought and talk about the world rather than the world itself, then attempts to solve problems of vagueness should focus on thought and talk.
2) Vagueness derives from our thought and talk about the world rather than the world itself.
3) Therefore attempts to solve problems of vagueness should focus on our thought and talk rather than the world itself.

Counter argument:
4) If what constitutes Mount Everest is vague and it is in the world itself, then the world itself can be vague.
5) What constitutes Mount Everest is vague, and it is in the world itself.
6) Therefore, the world itself can be vague.

I think premise (2) could be denied (as I have tried to show with my counter argument) or at least it not always the case that (2). I am aware that Williamson says that these types of things (like Mount Everest) are not the things he is concerned with. That is, he is only concerned with vague predicates. But, if predicates are about the things they apply to, and those things themselves are vague, then perhaps it is the things themselves (objects like Everest) that pose a problem. In other words, perhaps this is more of an ontological problem. Williamson doesn’t mention this as an option, I think he actually rules it out, but I’m unsure of why, especially when he says things like “counting every water molecule wouldn’t tell us when mars was dry”. This sounds rather unintuitive to me.

If there are vague predicates, and the extension of a predicate is the set of things which it applies to, then could it not follow that the predicate is vague in virtue of its extension being vague? I’m not confused about the word ‘dry’ and the words ‘not dry’, but if the extension of the original question is by no means verifiable, that is, no such evidence that would make the extension of the original question true or false, then it seems to me that the problem is with the world, and that that is why our thought or talk about it ends up being vague. I think that perhaps the vagueness of the object just gets filtered up through language. To be more precise, the way we speak about something as being vague reflects the vagueness of the thing itself.

Williamson writes that some may “deny outright when Mars is a borderline case that it is either dry or not dry, and therefore to answer the original question in the negative. However, if one answers the original question in the negative this means that Mars is neither dry nor not dry. Another way to put this is that Mars is both not dry and not not dry, which is a contradiction. I thought that this could be avoided if one simply rephrased the original question from “Was Mars always either dry or not dry?” to (the new original question) “Was Mars always either dry or wet?” Thus to answer the new original question in the negative would be to say that Mars is both not dry and not wet, which has no contradiction.
1. If the new original question means the same as the original question then the original question can be changed to “Was Mars always either dry or wet?”
2. The new original question means the same as the original question.
3. Therefore the original question can be changed to “Was Mars always either dry or wet?”
4. If the original question can be changed to “Was Mars always either dry or wet?” then answering the original question in the negative is not a contradiction.
5. Therefore answering the original question in the negative is not a contradiction.
Williamson may be able to respond by denying premise 2 of the argument. To show how Williamson could respond more clearly I will change the original question to something easier to quantify. I will change it to “Was Mars always either below zero degrees or not below zero degrees?” Let us assume that Mars does reach above and below zero degrees. To answer this question in the negative would be to say that Mars is both not below zero degrees and not not below zero degrees, which is a contradiction. Thus I will change the question from “Was Mars always either below zero degrees or not below zero degrees?” to “Was Mars always either below zero degrees or above zero degrees?” These two questions are not the same because the second question has a middle, namely zero degrees. Therefore X and its opposite are not the same as X and ~X. Below zero or not below zero is smaller than 0 or greater than or equal to 0, while below zero or above zero is smaller than 0 or greater than 0. Some may deny this line of argument for a term such as ‘dry’, or say that ‘dryness’ can not be quantified.

Garret's Post

The argument that I will be presenting and critiquing resides in Chapter 2 of Williamson’s “The Philosophy of Philosophy”. Three-value and fuzzy logicians offer the following argument in response to the proposition ‘Mars was always either dry or not dry’. Here, they offer support for their claim in saying that it is more of an indefinite answer as opposed to a borderline case of answering definitively with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’.

1. If it was once indefinite whether Mars was dry then it is indefinite whether Mars was always either dry or not dry
2. It was once indefinite whether Mars was dry
3. It is indefinite whether Mars was always either dry or not dry

This argument uses the basic rule of modus ponens ‘If P then Q. P, therefore Q’. The first premise is valid; that is, if something was indefinitely some thing at one point in time then it could not have been always been that thing. The second premise merely states that the first component of the first premise exists, and thus naturally its second component must also exist. Using the same structure from the first argument, let us consider what would happen if we substituted ‘Mars’ with ‘2+2=4’ and ‘dry’ with ‘true’.

1. If it was once indefinite whether ‘2+2=4’ was ‘true’ then it is indefinite whether ‘2+2=4’ was always either ‘true’ or not ‘true’
2. It was once indefinite whether ‘2+2=4’ was ‘true’
3. It is indefinite whether ‘2+2=4’ was always either ‘true’ or not ‘true’

The first premise uses the same logic again and therefore must maintain its validity. Since the proposition ‘2+2=4’ is a necessary truth, we can also substitute ‘2+2=4’ with ‘necessary truth’. While the second premise may have difficulty in obtaining support, it is easy to provide a time in history where indeed it might have once been indefinite whether the addition of two and two could have equalled four or that any other necessary truth is true for that matter. With that, we are left with the concluding premise that is false. We do know that ‘2+2=4’ or that any necessary truths were never indefinitely true, but always true, regardless of our beliefs in them. While both arguments may be valid in their structure, the second is obviously not sound, which casts doubt unto the soundness of the first.

Here is a reconstruction of a sound and valid argument one could use in favour of the original proposition:

1. At any given time, If Mars can never be both dry and not dry, then it may only be either dry or not dry.
2. At any given time, Mars can never be both dry and not dry
3. Therefore, at any given time, Mars must either be dry or not dry

Since this argument structure emulates that of a logical truth, it necessarily follows that either Mars is either dry or not dry at any given point of time. The ‘at any given point of time’ component was added to satisfy the temporal condition of ‘was’. It could also be used to satisfy an ‘is’ component if the example were taking specifically about a present example, as opposed to one being used from the past.

Natalie's Comments

Williamson Chapter 2

This is the argument that Williamson gives in point 3, pg. 22:

(1) The original question is not about thought or language

(2) To answer the original question you have to assess rival theories of vagueness in thought and language.

(3) We cannot get an appropriate answer from doing (2)

(4) Therefore, the original question is surreptitiously about thought or language.

It seems that (4) doesn’t follow from (1), (2) and (3), because it seems the case that you could exchange it with (4a) and it would seem to be true.

(4a) Therefore, the original question, because it is a question and not a statement, cannot be philosophically analyzed.

Also it seems that (2) isn’t definitely true. If this is the case then it doesn’t matter that (3) because we could find a different way of answering it or if we accept (4a) then answering the original question doesn’t tell us anything.

I’m really not sure on any of this, I just find it weird that Williamson feels he needs this argument to conclude that the original question is secretly about thought or language because then he is accepting premise (3); that we will never be able to answer it appropriately, which kind of seems like a copout.
I could also be taking this totally wrong because I just don’t know enough of the background yet to comment on his second point in chapter 2.

Williamson’s argument is definitely not-definitely sound.

In chapter 2, on pages 16-17, Williamson introduces the sentence operator Δ, read as ‘definitely’ and argues as follows:
1) ‘Δ’ has the same kind of semantics as ‘~’, both are given by a many-valued truth table.
2) If (1), then (3).
3) ‘Δ’ is no more a metalinguistic symbol than ‘~’ is.
4) ~P is about whatever P is about (which is not metalinguistic).
5) If (3)&(4), then (6).
6) ΔP is about whatever P is about (which is not metalinguistic).
7) P is indefinite iff ~ ΔP.
8) If (4)&(6)&(7), then (C).
C) Replying to the question ‘Is Mars dry?’ by saying ‘indefinite’ is not a metalinguistic response; it is a response about Mars.

I deny (1). Though it is true that the semantics of both Δ and ~ are given by a many-valued truth table, it is false that Δ has the same kind of semantics as ~. Accepting Δ into the object language leads to semantic paradox, whereas accepting ~ alone into the object language is innocuous. To see why, consider the following sentence:
i) ‘The proposition expressed by (i) is indefinite.’
Now, by (7) to assert (~ ΔP) is to assert (P is indefinite) so the sentence (i) is equivalent to ‘~ Δ the proposition expressed by (i)’.
But, on Williamson’s proposed semantics for ‘Δ’,
if (i) is true, then (i) is false;
if (i) is false, then (i) is true;
and if (i) is intermediately valued, then (i) is false.
In all three cases, whether one adheres to a bivalent semantics or one of the many-valued semantics canvassed by Williamson, having ‘Δ’ as a symbol in the object language allows one to construct paradoxical sentences that appear to be both true and not-true. The standard solution here would be to say that we can only use ‘Δ’ metalinguistically. However, this approach is not open to Williamson given his argument. Another possible save would be to accept dileathism, the view that sentences/propositions can be both true and false. But this seems like an extreme concession. He could also argue that sentences like (i) are in some sense illegitimate sentences. While this move seems initially attractive it is notoriously hard to support, as has been demonstrated in the discussion surrounding the traditional liar’s paradox. In sum, if Williamson wants to retain his point when formulating his argument in terms of 'Δ', it appears that he will have to make some serious foundational concessions.

Experimental Philosophy Blog

I should have linked to this earlier: a blog by and for real live experimental philosophers.

Millianism = Platonism?

I have fairly little background on this, and hopefully I'm way off (because being right would make me sad).

Here's the checklist of similarity:
(1) There are concrete things: check. (duh)
(2) There are also abstract things: check.
(3) These abstract things exist in a publicly accessible domain: check.
(4) These abstract things are not mind-dependent: check? P:check. M:tentative check?
(5) These abstract things are the objects of thought: check.
(6) When we speak we express a token of the type: check.

(7) Do we token when we think, or do we interact with the type directly? I don't know what either says about this.

Chris, or anyone for that matter, please tell us we haven't regressed a few thousand years. What's the difference?

Also, I'm guessing Fregianism denies (4), and maybe (3). Correct?

More Blog Discussions of Our Topic

As a result of the discussion initiated here, one of the disputants has laid out his case for intuition-driven philosophy here. As before, there are already several good comments.

A little late, but I hope this kind of resembles something of a comment paper. I am still trying to wrap my head around some of the material, so if anyone is reading this, please don't mock me.

My comment paper is in regards to the Sorites paradox (i.e. what the heck is a heap?) and one of the proposed solutions mentioned in "The Era of Specialization."

The paradox:
1) A single grain of sand by itself is not a heap of sand
2) If one has something that is not a heap of sand, and one adds a single grain of sand to it, it is still not a heap of sand

Since the term "heap" is a vague predicate, it would seem that there is no exact dividing line between heaps of sand and non-heaps of sand. However, this taken with #2 seems to suggest that no matter how many grains of sand one adds, it will never sufficiently constitute a heap, which seems odd to say.

Several positions on the Sorites paradox are mentioned, but I have chosen the view that makes the least sense to me, namely, the degree-of-truth-and-application views. This view is that "the application of a vague predicate is not an all or nothing affair, but comes in degrees, as does the truth claims made using such a predicate..."

So essentially, as I understand it: "On a scale of one to ten, the truth value of saying "yes" to the phrase 'this pile is a heap of sand,' is 3."

It seems odd to say, that something is “sort of” a heap of sand, and moreover this just splits the problem down further. For, if a predicate comes in degrees, then it would seem difficult to discern between the varying degrees. Where does one draw the line to which something is a heap to a lesser degree, until the point in which it no longer becomes a heap? If something is definitely not a heap at one grain of sand, and still definitely not a heap at two grains of sand but a heap to a greater degree than just one grain, where is the exact point in which there is a distinct “heap” of sand present, equal to the degree of certainty that we can clearly state as being the case when we assert that one grain of sand is definitely not a heap of sand?

(Also, the statement “two grains of sand is not a heap, but is more a heap than one grain of sand” doesn’t seem to make sense in itself, because two grains of sand is clearly no more of a heap than one grain. Though it is closer to having enough grains of sand to be a heap, it is still no closer to being a heap in and of itself than the one grain of sand.)

Garret's Post

The argument that I will be presenting and critiquing resides in Soames “Philosophical Analysis”, in which Quinean theory sets out to disprove the intelligibility of essentialism. The argument is as follows:

1. Essential properties of objects are defined as notions of necessity
2. Necessity is conveyed by predicates (i.e. the application to sentences; … is a necessary truth) or by use of the operator (i.e. the attachment to sentences; it is necessary that …)
3. Thus, for any applicable choice of a term t that refers to or describes o it is necessary that if t exists, then t is F.

Quine’s response to this argument attacks the concluding third premise, stating that by observing any object o, that there are some terms t that refer to o which make the sentence ‘It is necessary that if t exists, then t is F’ true or false depending on its context. So it is this relation that Quine rests his counterargument upon. Here is his counterexample:

1. Mathematicians are necessarily rational
2. Mathematicians are not necessarily two-legged
3. Cyclists are necessarily two-legged
4. Cyclists are not necessarily rational
5. There are individuals who consider themselves as both mathematicians and cyclists
6. Thus, there are properties that can be necessary or contingent relative to how you are describing the individual

However, the next question need be asked is what of considering o by itself and exclusive from any characterizations? While none of the readings are suggestive of any aiding theories, I would argue that this Quine’s rebuttal in itself is not enough to refute essentialism in its entirety. If we are inquiring about a specific individual and his properties, are we not comparing all of them in relation to himself, as he is, and none of his particular identities? There clearly are many objects and individuals in which properties are both clearly and distinctly essential or contingent; which seems counterintuitive to Quine’s reasoning.

Even with the case of considering multiple identities into one example it would be redundant to consider every case in such a way. Conceivably, you may add every type of attribute that that thing or person is (i.e. The individual is a mathematician, cyclist, female, blue-eyed, mother, etc.) as opposed to, in retrospect, just considering one identity or one type of thing at a time.

I will present one of Williamson’s arguments, and then give a critic of that argument, and finally I will refute the critic.
Williamson argues for the conclusion that “[w]e should adopt no conception of philosophy that on methodological grounds excludes elusive objects.”
1. If it is possible that reality contains elusive objects then it is possible that not everything is thinkable.
2. If it is possible that not everything is thinkable then “[w]e should adopt no conception of philosophy that on methodological grounds excludes elusive objects.”
3. It is possible that reality contains elusive objects.
4. Therefore it is possible that not everything is thinkable.
5. Therefore “[w]e should adopt no conception of philosophy that on methodological grounds excludes elusive objects.”
A criticism one could give to this argument is to deny the 2nd premise, on the grounds that there is no evidence that there are elusive objects and therefore it is more likely that there are no elusive objects, and everything is thinkable. Thus, just because it is possible that not everything is thinkable does not mean “[w]e should adopt no conception of philosophy that on methodological grounds excludes elusive objects”, since there is no evidence that elusive objects exist.
6. If there is no evidence that elusive objects exist then we should not abandon conceptions of philosophy that on methodological grounds excludes elusive objects.
7. There is no evidence that elusive objects exist.
8. Therefore we should not abandon conceptions of philosophy that on methodological grounds excludes elusive objects.
This criticism does not work because premise 6 is false. McDowell’s argument requires the premise that everything is thinkable. Just there being a logical possibility, (no matter how unlikely) is enough so that McDowell can not claim the premise that everything is thinkable.

Post 2

This is one of the arguments that Frege presents in “On Sense and Reference”. It can also be found in Frege's Puzzle by Salmon, and a kagillon other papers, books, etc. Just as the argument we formulated in class asks whether propositions are extensions of sentences, the same question can be asked, as to whether referents are extensions of singular terms? I followed the same outline, format wise for this argument but did it both à la Frege and à la us, which is closer to the Salmon version. One of the things I find most difficult in philosophy is that people use different words yet define them synonymously (ha! that's a hint about what the arguments below pertain to...), so if I make a misstep with respect to synonymy or the layout of the arguments, let me know.

Frege's Version:

1. If the sense designated by a sign is it's reference, then any two signs that have the same reference designate the same sense.
   p→q
   
2. 'Mata Hari' and 'Margaretha Zelle' have the same reference, but do not designate the same sense.
   r
   
3. If (2), then it is false that any two signs that have the same reference designate the same sense.
   r→~q
   
4. So, it is false that any signs that have the same reference designate the same sense.
   ~q (3,2) MP
   
5. Therefore, it is false that the sense designated by a sign is it's reference.
   ~p (1,4)MT
   

The Argument Again With Some Different Words:

1. If the information content encoded by a singular term is it's extension, then any two singular terms that have the same extension encode the same information.
   p→q
   
2. 'Mata Hari' and 'Margaretha Zelle' have the same extension, but do not encode the same information.
   r
   
3. If (2), then it is false that any two singular terms that have the same extension encode the same information.
   r→~q
   
4. So, it is false that any singular terms that have the same extension encode the same information.
   ~q (3,2) MP
   
5. Therefore, it is false that the information content encoded by a singular term is it's extension.
   ~p (1,4)MT
   

So, what to say about this... Either I can deny (1), (2), or both. If I deny (2), then 'Mata Hari' and 'Margaretha Zelle' do not have the same extension, that is that they do not have the same referent @ w, this is assuming that both terms are rigid and not flaceid (on some construe of flaceidity?) and that a singular terms extension is the referent. If I deny (1) , then I have to deny the consequent, (i.e. assert (4)). That it is false that any two singular terms that have the same extension encode the same information. Honestly, I still (yep been thinking about this for a while now...) haven't decided which I prefer. Big problem. I'll jump off the fence soon enough, hopefully.

Conceptual Philosophers believe that the goal of philosophy is to analyze the structure of concepts. A problem for this view is that concepts constitute only a small fraction of reality. Williamson considers that if Russellianism is true everything, by definition would be considered concepts. Williamson presents the following argument for the conclusion that one can oppose the conceptual turn even if one accepts Russellianism. If one can accept the conceptual turn, if one accepts Russellianism, then the conceptual turn analyzes everything philosophy should analyze.
1. If conceptualist accepts Russellianism then the conceptualist will analyze propositional conceptual structure and not other nonconceptual structure.
2. If the conceptual turn analyzes everything philosophy should analyze then philosophy should not analyze nonconceptual structure.
3. It is false that philosophy should not analyze nonconceptual structure.
4. Therefore it is false the conceptual turn analyzes everything philosophy should analyze.
5. Therefore it is false that one can accept the conceptual turn if one accepts Russellianism.
A criticism one could give to this argument is to deny the 3rd premise. However, mereological and chemical structure are nonconceptual structures, thus to deny that philosophy should analyze nonconceptual structure is to deny that philosophy should analyze mereological and chemical structures. Williamson argues “that philosophy can appropriately investigate general features of nonconceptual structure too, such as the mereological structure of physical objects.”
6. If philosophy should not analyze nonconceptual structure then philosophy should not analyze mereological or chemical structure.
7. It is false that philosophy should not analyze mereological or chemical structure.
8. Therefore it is false that philosophy should not analyze nonconceptual structure.

Natalie's Comments

This is a reconstruction of the argument between Kripke and Quine about the connection between rigid designators and essentialism.

(i) A term is a rigid designator if it picks out the same property, n in all possible world-states in which the object o containing that property exists.

(ii) A property P is essential to an object o when the claim it is necessary that if o exists then o is P, is true

(iii) If n is a rigid designator of o, and F is a predicate expressing the property P, then the claim that P is an essential property of o is the equivalent to the claim it is necessary that if n exists, then n is F.

(iv) There will be some terms t that refer to o which make the sentence it is necessary that if t exists, then t is F false.

(v) There is no principled, non- arbitrary way of selecting, for an arbitrary object o and property P, what sort of term t should be used to underwrite claims to the effect that o did, or did not, have P essentially.

(vi) So, objects have or lack properties essentially only relative to ways of describing them.

I think that there is a problem with premise (iv). It is necessary that if I, Natalie exist, then I am a human. This is true because it is the case that in all possible worlds, to be considered Natalie, it is a necessary property to be human. I could also say that it is necessary that if I exist, then I have a dog named Arthur. This is false because it could be the case that in some possible world I do not have a dog, or I have a dog and his name is Bob, etc. This tells me that the property of having a dog named Arthur is not an essential property of being Natalie. So then having a dog named Arthur is not a rigid designator of Natalie.
Quine’s example gives two separate properties to an individual i, that make the sentence it is necessary that if t exists, then t is F false. It goes like this:

Let i be some individual who is both a brilliant mathematician and a champion cyclist, and suppose that the world’s greatest mathematician and the world’s greatest cyclist both designate i. Then (a) is false.
(a) it is necessary that: if the world’s greatest mathematician exists, then the world’s greatest mathematician is two-legged.

So, premise (iv) seems correct in claiming that there are some instances where the sentence it is necessary that if t exists, then t is F is false.
There seems to be something fishy with this example; if i is an individual that is rigidly designated by the properties brilliant mathematician and champion cyclist then wouldn’t (a) be true because if the world’s greatest mathematician is a champion cyclist, then it follows that the world’s greatest mathematician is two legged. So, I think that Quine’s example doesn’t necessarily prove premise (iv).

Dan's Comment paper 2

Chapter two of Williamson presents a case study meant to show that not all philosophical problems are about language or thought. During the chapter he seems to be implicitly resisting two sorts of arguments:
A) any philosophical problem is equivalent to a conceptual/linguistic problem
B) B -> C
C) any philosophical problem is about concepts/language

and

1) if any sort of problem solved by examining concepts/language then it is a conceptual/linguistic problem
2) philosophical problems are solved by examining concepts/language
3) philosophical problems are conceptual/linguistic problems

Williamson seems to deny both (A) and (B), as well as (1). I'll concentrate on the response to the second argument.
The philosophical problem on the table is to decide the truth value (or lack thereof) of (M):

(M) Mars was always either dry or not dry

It's clear that (given mars dried gradually over time) no amount of empirical data will either confirm or deny (M). For simplicity, suppose all relevant data has already been collected. (M) is clearly about Mars and it's dryness or lack of dryness. To support this, Williamson notes that no metalinguistic or metaconceptual terminology appears in (M). However all proposed solutions to the problem involve analysis of the concepts or language involved(mostly analysis on the meta-logical level), what gives? To deny that this is a problem, Williamson takes an ordinary example from outside of philosophy and gives an argument.

4) When deciding a court verdict, consideration about thought/language are often brought into account. Irregardless, in a criminal case Guilt or Innocence of the defendant is the main issue, not language or concepts.
5) (4) -> (6)
6) ~(1)

A proponent of the linguistic/conceptual turn can simply assert that (2) -> (3) in response (and retain soundess of the previous argument). They can accept analysis in language and thought from other disciplines, but it's philosophy they're concerned with. Should they be sticklers about it, they can assert that the role of linguistic or conceptual analysis is clear in those other cases, but seems to be unusually dominant in the case of philosophy. Williamson's explanation as to what exactly we're up to when ascending to the metalinguistic/conceptual level can be seen as a response:

7) (2)
8) analysis of language & concepts help us decide what inferences are valid when discussing issues other than language & thought
9) (8) -> ~(3)
10) ~(3)
11) (2)&~(3)
12) ~ ((2) -> (3))

A little motivation for (9) is needed. Basically, given (8) the role of linguistic/conceptual analysis in philosophy is explained in many cases (and that role is NOT to be subject matter). If this is so, then the motivation for accepting (3) is defeated, since we only accepted (3) in the first place because of the large unexplained role of linguistic/conceptual analysis in philosophy.
A possible response would be to deny (9). After all, (8) does not show that (3) is false. If some other motivation for accepting (3) were found, this argument would not cover it. Personally, this seems hand-wavey to me. As far as I can tell, Williamson has a pretty strong point in this chapter.

Justin (D)'s comment

In assessing Quinean critiques of essentialism, Soames offers the following line of reasoning that applies to skeptical critiques in general:

1) For any philosophical thesis X and any philosophical system/framework/model S, If intuition points to X being true and a seemingly coherent system S has been constructed that “incorporates” X, then if a skeptic is to legitimately object to X, he/she needs to offer reasons for thinking that S is incoherent or that X is false.

2) (1) -> (3) If intuition suggests that Kripkean essentialism (KE) is true and the seemingly coherent Kripkean modal framework (KMF) has been constructed, which “incorporates” Kripkean essentialism, then if a skeptic is to legitimately object to Kripkean essentialism, he/she needs to offer reasons for thinking that the Kripkean modal framework is incoherent or that Kripkean essentialism is false.

3) If intuition suggests that KE is true and the seemingly coherent system KMF has been constructed, which and “incorporates” KE, then if a skeptic is to legitimately object to KE, he/she needs to offer reasons for thinking that the KMF is incoherent or that KE is false.

4) Intuition suggests that KE is true, and a seemingly coherent system, namely KMF, has been constructed that “incorporates” KE.

5) [(3)&(4)] -> (6) If a skeptic is to legitimately object to KE, he/she needs to offer reasons for thinking that KMF is incoherent or that KE is false.

6) If a skeptic is to legitimately object to KE, he/she needs to offer reasons for thinking that KMF is incoherent or that KE is false.

7) The Quineans’ objection to KE (that rigid designation demands explanation) is an objection based on general (or external) skepticism that fails to show that the KMF is incoherent.

8) The Quineans’ objection to KE does not show that KE is false (and, strictly speaking, the Quineans do not presume to have shown that KE is false).

9) [(6)&(7)&(8)] -> (10) It is false that Quineans have legitimately objected to KE. [This follows from an application of Modus Tollens and DeMorgans Law, since the consequent of (6) is (not-(7) or not-(8)).]

10) It is false that Quineans have legitimately objected to KE.

11) For all objections O (to a theory X), if O is a legitimate objection (an objection in keeping with standards we must recognize) that skeptics have raised against a theory X and has been successfully rebutted, or O is illegitimate, then X has been successfully defended.

12) If the Quinean objection is a legitimate objection (an objection in keeping with standards we must recognize) that skeptics have raised against KE and has been successfully rebutted, or the Quinean objection is illegitimate, then KE has been successfully defended. [Instantiation of (11)]
13) [(10)&(12)]-> KE has been successfully defended.

14) KE has been successfully defended.

In this reconstruction, my primary concerns are the general methodological considerations that Soames invokes, (1) and (11). My main objection to (1) is that the assumption of its antecedent does not ground its consequent conditional, namely, that ‘if a skeptic is to legitimately object to X, he/she needs to offer reasons for thinking that S is incoherent or that X is false’. It seems to me that one can legitimately object to a philosophical position without showing the system it is embedded in to be incoherent *or*, alternately, without showing that it is false directly. Amongst other ways, one can also object to a philosophical position if it is foundationally lacking. This, I take it, is one of the Quineans main points against KE. Kripke’s theory of naming, and hence rigid designation, is not sufficiently worked out. While I do not endorse this Quinean contention (the “description theory” of names that Quineans are relying on is not exactly firm bedrock), I think that Soames’ methodological constraints are too strong. There are other ways to object to philosophical positions.
My uneasiness with (11) then is parallel to my worry regarding (1). Simply stated, I am unsure that Soames and I have the same idea of what ‘standards’ an objection is to meet for it to be legitimate. Certainly, internalist objections, coherency objections and worries of falsehood are some of the weightier objections to a theory. However, there is also something to be said for having a clearly laid foundation. Being clearly reducible is a virtue. As for the consequent of (11), Soames admits that some cases where the conditional is satisfied and a theory X has been successfully defended are cases with a ‘Moorean flavor’. Perhaps it is this flavor that I’m discontent with. (Moreover, since most epistemologists prefer fish flavored ice-cream to anything with a Moorean flavor, I think that I’m probably not alone here).
[On a side note, I think that Soames is on to something by first examining models that are based on intuitions. Many of the best mathematical proofs are generalizations of evident or intuitive instances. Moreover, it is easier to properly criticize erroneous intuitions when they are formalized, if for no other reason than that clarity of exposition plainly exposes flaws.]