*Frege's Puzzle*by Salmon, and a kagillon other papers, books, etc. Just as the argument we formulated in class asks whether propositions are extensions of sentences, the same question can be asked, as to whether referents are extensions of singular terms? I followed the same outline, format wise for this argument but did it both à la Frege and à la us, which is closer to the Salmon version. One of the things I find most difficult in philosophy is that people use different words yet define them synonymously (ha! that's a hint about what the arguments below pertain to...), so if I make a misstep with respect to synonymy or the layout of the arguments, let me know.

Frege's Version:

- If the sense designated by a sign is it's reference, then any two signs that have the same reference designate the same sense.

p→q - 'Mata Hari' and 'Margaretha Zelle' have the same reference, but do not designate the same sense.

r - If (2), then it is false that any two signs that have the same reference designate the same sense.

r→~q - So, it is false that any signs that have the same reference designate the same sense.

~q (3,2) MP - Therefore, it is false that the sense designated by a sign is it's reference.

~p (1,4)MT

The Argument Again With Some Different Words:

- If the information content encoded by a singular term is it's extension, then any two singular terms that have the same extension encode the same information.

p→q - 'Mata Hari' and 'Margaretha Zelle' have the same extension, but do not encode the same information.

r - If (2), then it is false that any two singular terms that have the same extension encode the same information.

r→~q - So, it is false that any singular terms that have the same extension encode the same information.

~q (3,2) MP - Therefore, it is false that the information content encoded by a singular term is it's extension.

~p (1,4)MT

So, what to say about this... Either I can deny (1), (2), or both. If I deny (2), then 'Mata Hari' and 'Margaretha Zelle' do not have the same extension, that is that they do not have the same referent @ w, this is assuming that both terms are rigid and not flaceid (on some construe of flaceidity?) and that a singular terms extension is the referent. If I deny (1) , then I have to deny the consequent, (i.e. assert (4)). That it is false that any two singular terms that have the same extension encode the same information. Honestly, I still (yep been thinking about this for a while now...) haven't decided which I prefer. Big problem. I'll jump off the fence soon enough, hopefully.

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