This is the argument which I will be looking at, which is found at the beginning of chapter two, and is then reiterated later on page 22/23. I will present a counter argument, which I think Williamson rejects to hastily, and discuss why I think the objection works.
1) If vagueness derives from our thought and talk about the world rather than the world itself, then attempts to solve problems of vagueness should focus on thought and talk.
2) Vagueness derives from our thought and talk about the world rather than the world itself.
3) Therefore attempts to solve problems of vagueness should focus on our thought and talk rather than the world itself.
4) If what constitutes
5) What constitutes
6) Therefore, the world itself can be vague.
I think premise (2) could be denied (as I have tried to show with my counter argument) or at least it not always the case that (2). I am aware that Williamson says that these types of things (like
If there are vague predicates, and the extension of a predicate is the set of things which it applies to, then could it not follow that the predicate is vague in virtue of its extension being vague? I’m not confused about the word ‘dry’ and the words ‘not dry’, but if the extension of the original question is by no means verifiable, that is, no such evidence that would make the extension of the original question true or false, then it seems to me that the problem is with the world, and that that is why our thought or talk about it ends up being vague. I think that perhaps the vagueness of the object just gets filtered up through language. To be more precise, the way we speak about something as being vague reflects the vagueness of the thing itself.