Justin (D)'s comment

In assessing Quinean critiques of essentialism, Soames offers the following line of reasoning that applies to skeptical critiques in general:

1) For any philosophical thesis X and any philosophical system/framework/model S, If intuition points to X being true and a seemingly coherent system S has been constructed that “incorporates” X, then if a skeptic is to legitimately object to X, he/she needs to offer reasons for thinking that S is incoherent or that X is false.

2) (1) -> (3) If intuition suggests that Kripkean essentialism (KE) is true and the seemingly coherent Kripkean modal framework (KMF) has been constructed, which “incorporates” Kripkean essentialism, then if a skeptic is to legitimately object to Kripkean essentialism, he/she needs to offer reasons for thinking that the Kripkean modal framework is incoherent or that Kripkean essentialism is false.

3) If intuition suggests that KE is true and the seemingly coherent system KMF has been constructed, which and “incorporates” KE, then if a skeptic is to legitimately object to KE, he/she needs to offer reasons for thinking that the KMF is incoherent or that KE is false.

4) Intuition suggests that KE is true, and a seemingly coherent system, namely KMF, has been constructed that “incorporates” KE.

5) [(3)&(4)] -> (6) If a skeptic is to legitimately object to KE, he/she needs to offer reasons for thinking that KMF is incoherent or that KE is false.

6) If a skeptic is to legitimately object to KE, he/she needs to offer reasons for thinking that KMF is incoherent or that KE is false.

7) The Quineans’ objection to KE (that rigid designation demands explanation) is an objection based on general (or external) skepticism that fails to show that the KMF is incoherent.

8) The Quineans’ objection to KE does not show that KE is false (and, strictly speaking, the Quineans do not presume to have shown that KE is false).

9) [(6)&(7)&(8)] -> (10) It is false that Quineans have legitimately objected to KE. [This follows from an application of Modus Tollens and DeMorgans Law, since the consequent of (6) is (not-(7) or not-(8)).]

10) It is false that Quineans have legitimately objected to KE.

11) For all objections O (to a theory X), if O is a legitimate objection (an objection in keeping with standards we must recognize) that skeptics have raised against a theory X and has been successfully rebutted, or O is illegitimate, then X has been successfully defended.

12) If the Quinean objection is a legitimate objection (an objection in keeping with standards we must recognize) that skeptics have raised against KE and has been successfully rebutted, or the Quinean objection is illegitimate, then KE has been successfully defended. [Instantiation of (11)]
13) [(10)&(12)]-> KE has been successfully defended.

14) KE has been successfully defended.

In this reconstruction, my primary concerns are the general methodological considerations that Soames invokes, (1) and (11). My main objection to (1) is that the assumption of its antecedent does not ground its consequent conditional, namely, that ‘if a skeptic is to legitimately object to X, he/she needs to offer reasons for thinking that S is incoherent or that X is false’. It seems to me that one can legitimately object to a philosophical position without showing the system it is embedded in to be incoherent *or*, alternately, without showing that it is false directly. Amongst other ways, one can also object to a philosophical position if it is foundationally lacking. This, I take it, is one of the Quineans main points against KE. Kripke’s theory of naming, and hence rigid designation, is not sufficiently worked out. While I do not endorse this Quinean contention (the “description theory” of names that Quineans are relying on is not exactly firm bedrock), I think that Soames’ methodological constraints are too strong. There are other ways to object to philosophical positions.
My uneasiness with (11) then is parallel to my worry regarding (1). Simply stated, I am unsure that Soames and I have the same idea of what ‘standards’ an objection is to meet for it to be legitimate. Certainly, internalist objections, coherency objections and worries of falsehood are some of the weightier objections to a theory. However, there is also something to be said for having a clearly laid foundation. Being clearly reducible is a virtue. As for the consequent of (11), Soames admits that some cases where the conditional is satisfied and a theory X has been successfully defended are cases with a ‘Moorean flavor’. Perhaps it is this flavor that I’m discontent with. (Moreover, since most epistemologists prefer fish flavored ice-cream to anything with a Moorean flavor, I think that I’m probably not alone here).
[On a side note, I think that Soames is on to something by first examining models that are based on intuitions. Many of the best mathematical proofs are generalizations of evident or intuitive instances. Moreover, it is easier to properly criticize erroneous intuitions when they are formalized, if for no other reason than that clarity of exposition plainly exposes flaws.]